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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In international commercial arbitration, practical considerations have traditionally
played a very important role m the parties' selection of the arbitral situs. There is always
a consideration for the availability of the arbitral infrastructure — skilled arbitrators,
secretarial staff, translators, good libraries, conference rooms etc.
Another criterion that goes into the selection of an arbitral situs is the desire for
neutrality. The venue of arbitration is generally a country different from those of the
parties. ' Arbitrating in one of the parties' countries has both practical and psychological
implications. For instance, arbitration between an Indian firm and a French company
takes place in Paris. During the course of hearings a witness makes a statement relating to
facts or circumstances of the case which is unknown to the Indian firm. This puts the
' It is very important that the parties are confident that their dispute is determined in an independent and
neutral manner. The choice of place of arbitration is also important in this respect. One of the reasons why
parties to an international contract agree to arbitration is the wish to have a neutral decision. See Allan
Philip. The Significance of the Place of Arbitration in International Arbitration, 1985 Y.B. Swed & Int'l
Arb. 37; The ICC rules on arbitration also give great importance to the need for neutrality. This is
illustrated by the provisions relating to the appointment of the arbitrator by the international court of
arbitration which provide that where the sole arbitrator or the chairman of the arbitration tribunal is to be
appointed by the international court of arbitration, the sole arbitrator or the chairman, as the case may be,
shall be chosen from a country other than those of which the parties are nationals. See Article para 6 of the
ICC rules on arbitration 1!
Indian firm at a practical disadvantage as it would no[ be able to verify the veracity of
this statement."
Assume an arbitration proceeding between an European company and the
government of a less developed third world country taking place in the territory of the
less developed third world country. The arbitration relates to a construction project of
high political value to the ruling party and the government criticizes the European
company in the local media. This criticism in the local media may lead to the
development of such circumstances or may change the political climate of the .v/7//.s in
such a way that it is (the situs) no longer congenial for the adequate presentation of its
case by the European company.'
Parties' selection of situs is not only a matter of convenience and neutrality but
has important legal consequences which may determine the effectiveness of arbitration as
means of dispute resolution. The place of arbitration may at times prove determinative of
whether the award would be successfully enforced or not. This becomes more apparent
and relevant in the light of the provision for reciprocity and commercial reservation in the
New York Convention, and refusal of recognition and enforcement of the award on the
basis of non-compliance with the law of the arbitral situs.^ In addition to this, arbitrations
under some conventions can take place only at certain specified venues and are governed
by the rules framed under the convention.''
" Derains. Choice of Place of Arbitration, 1986 Int'l Bus. L. J. 109.
'Id. at 110.
* See Article V(l ) (a), (d) and (e) of the New York Convention Infra note 41
' See Washington Convention of 1965 Infra Chapter II.
At times there is a threat of destruction of the subject matter of arbitration which
gives rise to the need for interim measures of protection. Consistent with the principles of
international law on jurisdiction the national courts of the place of arbitration possess the
necessary jurisdiction to order the parties to the arbitration agreement or the third parties,
where the disputed property is in their possession, to preserve this subject matter of
arbitration pending an award on the merits of the dispute ' The type and extent of relief
which these courts may order varies from one jurisdiction to another. Apart from that, the
circumstances in which these national courts take jurisdiction, to order interim relief, also
varies from one state to another.
All legal systems of the world exercise some control and supervision over the
arbitration proceedings conducted on their territories This supervision is generally
exercised by providing for challenge or review of the award which, under the national
law of the arbitral situs, is exercised by providing grounds for reflisal of recognition and
enforcement of the award and/or setting aside of the awards. These grounds of
challenging an arbitral award vary from one system to another and may take different
forms depending on the legal system of the arbitral situs.^
Apart from these concerns, the public policy of the arbitral situs plays a very
important role Certain disputes which are arbitrable under the public policy of the situs
may not be so arbitrable under the public policy of the country where enforcement is
sought. This may result in the award being denied recognition and enforcement.
^ See Wagoner Jiifra note 98
^ See Cliapter III Infro
In addition, it is the law of the forum that is appHcable to matters like arbitrability
of the dispute, the validity of the arbitration agreement, jurisdiction of the arbitrators,
their appointment, removal and replacement and the challenge to their authority. Apart
from these matters the law of the arbitral situs also governs the conflict of laws rules
applicable to the dispute Though the principle of party autonomy allows the parties to
agree to a procedural law other than that of the arbitral situs, they still have to comply
with the mandator^' provisions of the law of the venue. In case they fail to comply with
the mandatory provisions of this law the resulting award may be denied recognition and
enforcement
The object of this thesis is to analyze these legal considerations and consequences
and to demonstrate why the choice of an arbitral situs is an important, if not the most
important, factor in the arbitral process.
* See New York Convention Infra Cliapter II.
CHAPTER II
Enforceability of Awards (Network of Treaties)
An arbitral tribunal has limited powers. Though these powers are generally
adequate for resolving the disputes between the parties, they often fall short of the
coercive powers possessed by the courts, the states being reluctant to confer upon a
private adjudicative body or tribunal the draconian powers they are willing and confer
upon the judges of their courts. The power of enforcing the award against a recalcitrant
party by methods such as attachment of bank accounts or confiscation of assets is a
prerogative of the state, which it is unlikely to delegate to a private tribunal. As a
necessary consequence the enforcement of the awards cannot take place without the
assistance of the courts of the place of enforcement, which operate under their own mles
of law.^ The detailed rules of procedure adopted by these courts of law vary from one
country to another. This brings into picture the role of international conventions which
seek to introduce a degree of certainty and uniformity in the recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards.
Indeed one of the outstanding features of an international arbitration award has to
be, and is, its ready and easy transportability. In other words, it should be possible to take
an arbitration award from the country or jurisdiction, where it has been rendered under
" ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 454 ( 1991
)
one system of rules of law, to other countries or jurisdictions, where it should be able to
qualify for enforcement under an entirely different system of rules of law For making an
award effective, the means of enforcement should be readily available Further these
means should be available internationally and not just in the jurisdiction where the award
is rendered '" This is all the more so because, in international arbitration, the siius of
arbitration is often one with which none of the parties have any contact." As a result, the
losing party may not have any assets in the jurisdiction where the award is rendered,
making it imperative to enforce the award in a foreign state with which the loosing party
has some connections which invariably are in the form of bank accounts or trading
accounts. This gives the international commercial arbitration its special feature i.e. the
country of enforcement is invariably different from the country where the arbitration took
place and the award was rendered. '^
Under the principles of private international law, enforcement of an arbitral
award, rendered in another jurisdiction, is governed by the domestic law of the
jurisdiction where the enforcement is sought. Absent international treaties and
conventions to the contrary, no obligation is imposed on a country, where enforcement is
sought, to recognize and enforce an arbitral award made in a foreign land. Nor are there
'^ Mat 455.
Id. at 454; The place of arbitration is usually chosen for its neutraht>.
- Id. at 455; Tliough it is teclmicalh possible that tJie place where tlie award is rendered is different from
tlie place where tlie arbitration proceedings took place, tliis discussion is confined to cases in w luch tlie
place of award and arbitration proceedings are tlie same.
any conditions restraining discrimination against foreign arbitral awards as compared to
domestic awards.
A. The Geneva Treaties
1. The Geneva Protocol of 1923
Amono all the international conventions, the Geneva Protocol, also known as the
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, or simply 'Protocol' which was concluded under the
auspices of the league of nations, was the first step towards the international recognition
and enforcement of arbitration clauses and agreements and the awards rendered in
pursuance of these agreements.
The Protocol made agreements for arbitration of present and fijture disputes valid
and irrevocable.''' It placed an obligation, on the courts invoked in defiance of the
agreement to arbitrate, to stay the proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration. The
protocol can thus be said to have two main objectives:
13
Elisabeth M. Senger-Weiss, Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards. 53 WTR Disp. Resol. J. 70 at 72.
" REDFERN & HUNTER. Supra note 9 at 455; See generally ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG. THE
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958. 6 (1981); See generally Nussbaum. Treaties on
Commercial Arbitration - A Test of International Pri\ate-Lavv Legislation, 56 Harw L. Rev. 219,
221(1942).
'"^
Article lof the Geneva Protocol provided: "Each of the Contracting States recognizes the \alidity of an
agreement relating to existing or future differences between parties subject respecti\ ely to the jurisdiction
of different Contracting States by which tlie parties to a contract agree to submit to arbitration all or any
differences tliat inay arise in cormection witli such contract relating to commercial matters or to any other
matter capable of settlement by arbitration, w hether or not tlie arbitration is to take place in a country to
w hose jurisdiction none of the parties is subject.
Each Contracting State reser\es the right to limit tlie obligation mentioned above to contracts,
which are considered as commercial under its national law. Any Contracting State which avails itself of this
right w ill notify the Secretary General of tlie League of Nations, in order tliat tlie otiier Contracting States
may be so infonned." See27 L.N.T.S. 157. 158.
^ Article 4 of tlie Genexa Protocol provided: "Tlie tribunals of tlie Contracting Parties, on being seized of a
dispute regarding a contract made between persons to whom Article 1 applies and including an Arbitration
Agreement whetlier referring to present and future differences which is \alid in \irtue of the said article and
capable of being carried into effect, sliall refer tlie piulies on an application of eitlier of them to the decision
of the arbitrators.
i) To ensure that the arbitration clauses were enforceable internationally
ii) To ensure that the arbitration awards made in pursuance of these
agreements would be enforced in the territory of the country in which they
are rendered.
This was an effort to ensure that the contracting nations would support arbitration
both at the beginning and at the end At the beginning by ensuring that the parties, who
had agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration, actually do so and towards the end,
by granting recognition to the awards rendered in their territories.''^ It is however
important to note that where the arbitral situs not a member nation no obligation is
imposed on the national courts to either stay the proceedings brought before them and
refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with the agreement or recognize the awards
rendered in an arbitration pursuant to the agreement to arbitrate even if they are rendered
within their territorial jurisdiction.
The Geneva Protocol of 1923, however, had its own limitations. It was applicable
only to agreements to arbitrate made between parties subject respectively to the
jurisdiction of different contracting countries.''" Some contracting countries interpreted
this to be a requirement of nationality while others interpreted it to be a requirement of
Such reference shall not prejudice tlie competence of tlie judicial tribunals in case the agreement to arbitrate
cannot proceed or becomes inoperative." See 27 L.N.T S 157. 159.
" See REDFERN & HUNTER, Supra note 9 at 455.
'* See Article 4 of the Geneva Protocol, Supra note 16.
Article 3 of tlie Gene\a Protocol provided: "Eacli Contracting State undertakes to ensure Uie execution
by its autliorities and in accordance witli tlie pro\isions of its national laws of arbitral awards made in its
own territor\ under tlie preceding article." See 27 L.N T.S. 157, 158.
'° See Article 1 of the Geneva Protocol, Supra note 15.
residence, domicile or usual pace of business.'^' The scope of the Protocol was further
limited by the contracting countries availing themselves of the 'commercial
reservation''" Nations could vary as to what was 'commercial" under their national laws.
Moreover, they could also differ in their interpretation of 'existing and fijture disputes'
and as to what matters were capable of being resolved by arbitration As regards the
enforcement of awards, each contracting country undertook only to enforce awards
rendered in its territory in pursuance of an arbitration agreement governed by the
Protocol. The Protocol did not provide for the international enforcement of arbitral
awards, as the ratifying nations were obliged to enforce arbitral awards rendered within
their jurisdiction only.'^"*
2. The Geneva Convention of 1927
In the year 1927 the Geneva Protocol was followed by the Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, also known as the Geneva Convention of 1927.
The Geneva Convention of 1927 took international arbitration a step ahead of the
Geneva Protocol of 1923 While the Geneva Protocol provided for the enforcement of the
awards domestically i.e. within the territory of the country where they are rendered'^'\ the
Geneva Convention provided for the international recognition and enforcement of arbitral
^' REDFERN & HUT^ER, Supro note 9 at 61; Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral
Awards: Enforcing Tlie Award Against The Recalcitrant Loser, 21 Wm. Mitchell L. Rex. 867, 875(1996).
^" See Article 1 of the Geneva Protocol, Supra note 15.
'^ See Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock. Supra note 2 1 at 875.
^'' REDFERN & HUNTER, Supra note 9 at 61. 62. 456; Article 3 of the Geneva Protocol. Supra note 19.
''Id.
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awards. It provided for the awards to be recognized and enforced in the territory of any of
the contracting countries. It placed an obligation on the contracting countries to recognize
and enforce an award if it:
1
.
Was made pursuant to an agreement to which the Geneva Protocol of 1923
applied;
2. The award was made in the territory of one of the contracting countries;
and
3. The parties to the award were subject to the jurisdiction of one of the
contracting countries.
If the award satisfied these preliminary conditions, the party seeking enforcement,
further had to prove that:
1
.
The award has become final in the country in which it was made ; and
2. The recognition and enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public
policy or the principles of law of the country where it is sought to be
relied upon.^^
'^
It was tJiought tliat the award should not be given a binding effect in anther countrs- when it is not
binding under llie laws of the nation w here it lias been rendered. See Ramona Martinez. Recognition and
Enforcement of International Awards Under tlie United Nations Convention of 1958: The "Refusal"
Provision. 24 INT'L LAW 487, 504 (1987).
^' Article lof the Geneva Convention provided; "In tlie territories of an\ High Contracting Party to which
the present Con\ ention applies, an arbitral award made in pursuance of an agreement to arbitrate w hether
relating to existing or future differences (hereinafter called "a submission to arbitration ') co\ered by the
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened at Geneva on September 24, 1923. shall be recognized as binding
and sliall be enforced in accordance w itli tlie rules of procedure of the terntor> w here tlie aw ard is relied
upon, pro\ ided Uiat tlie said award lias been in a territory of one of tlie High Contracting Parties to w hich
tlie present Convention applies and between persons who are subject to tlie jurisdiction of one of the High
Contracting Parties.
To obtain such a recognition or enforcement, it sliall. furtlier. be necessar>':
a) That tlie award lias been made in pursuance of a submission to arbitration which is valid under
tlie law apphcable tliereto;
b) Tliat tlie subject-matter of tlie award is capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the
countr>- in which tlie award is ought to be relied upon:
11
Like the Geneva Protocol of 1923 the Geneva Convention also had some inherent
shortcomings. If the arbitral situs is not a member nation there is no obligation to
recognize and enforce the arbitration agreement nor is there any obligation on the
national courts of the country of enforcement to recognize the award made in arbitrations
held pursuant to these agreements even if the country of enforcement is a signatory to the
Geneva Convention. The requirement that the award should have become fmal in the
territory of the nation where it has been made left the interpretation of the term Tmal" to
the discretion of the courts of that nation. ^^ In many countries an award is recognized to
have become fmal only if the local courts grant leave for its enforcement, whether by way
of an exequatur or otherwise. Thus the requirement that the award should have become
fmal in the jurisdiction of the country where it is rendered, resulted in 'double exequatur'
as first leave for enforcement had to be obtained from the courts of the country where the
award is made and then from the courts of the country where it is sought to be relied
29
upon.
The requirement for the award to be in line with the public policy or the principles
of law of the country in which it was sought to be relied upon exposed it to challenge not
c) Tliat tlie award lias been made by the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in tlie submission to
arbitration or constituted in the manner agreed upon by tlie parties and in conformity with tlie law
governing the arbitration procedure;
d) Tliat tlie award has become final in the country in wliich it lias been made, m the sense tliat it
will not be considered as such if it is open to opposition, appel or pourvoi en cassation (in tlie countries
where such forms of procedure e.xist) or if it is proved Uiat any proceedings for tlie purpose of contesting
tlie validity of the a\\ ard are pending;
e) Tliat the recognition or enforcement of tlie award is not contran to public policy or to Uie
pnnciples of law of the countr> in which it is sought to be relied upon "; It is important to note tliat the
burden of proof of compliiince witli tliese requirements was on tlie party seeking enforcement of the
award." See 92 L.N.T.S. 301, 305.
^^ See Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock. Supra note 21 at 876.
^^ See REDFERN & HUNTER. Supra note 9 at 457; Jane L.Volz & Roger S. Ha\dock. Supra note 21 at
877.
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only on the grounds of public policy but also on the grounds that it oftended the
principles of law of the country of enforcement Though it is understandable that no
country would recognize and enforce an award that is contrary to its public policy it is
difficult to see why the principles of law of the country of enforcement should be taken
into account when the award is in harmony with the legal principles of the country where
it has been made.''^
B. New York Convention of 1958
The International Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, also known as the New York Convention of 1958, is the most important
international treaty entered into, to date, in relation to international commercial
arbitration.
The New York Convention had its genesis in the shortcomings of the Geneva
treaties"''' and it replaces the Geneva Treaties i.e. the Protocol of 1923 and the Convention
of 1927 for the countries that are members to the Geneva Treaties and the New York
Convention. It provides a much more simple, convenient and effective method for the
^° See CI. (d) & (e) of Article 1 of the Geneva Convention. Supra note 27; Tlie burden of proof was on the
partv' seeking Uie enforcement of tlie aw ard.
^' This requirement lias been earned o\ cr to Uie New York Convention and tiie Model Law.
REDFERN & HUNTER, Supra note 9 at 457; This requirement has not been carried over to the New
York Convention or tlie Model Law.
" See generally VAN DEN BERG, Supra note 14 at 4. 6-9. 113.
Article VII(2) of the New York Con\ention proxides: "Tlie Geneva Protocol on tlie Arbitration Clauses
of 1923 and tlie Gene\'a Convention on the E.xecution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease to
have effect betw een Contracting States on their becoming bound and to tlie extent they become bound, by
13
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. For enforcing an arbitration
agreement the New York Convention uses the technique adopted by the Geneva Protocol.
It requires the courts of the contracting countries to refer the dispute, in regard to which
an arbitration agreement has been entered into between the parties, to arbitration unless
they find the agreement to be null and void or inoperative or incapable of performance.
As regards the arbitral awards the scope of the New York Convention is much
wider than the Geneva Treaties and it applies to arbitral awards made in the territor\' of
any country. ^^ Unlike the Protocol of 1923 it does not subject the parties, to the
arbitration agreement, to the jurisdiction of different contracting countries It imposes
an obligation on the contracting countries to give effect to these awards in accordance
with their rules of procedure and not to reflise execution on the grounds that these awards
TO
have not been rendered in the territory of a member country." Another significant
tins Convention." See 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 44. li is important to note tliat almost all of tJic worlds major
trading nations are members to Uie New York con\ enlion and for tins reason tJie Geneva treaties are often
considered to be of historical importance only.
^^ Article II of the New York Convention provides:
"(1) Each Contracting Party shall recognize an agreement in writhig under which Uie parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences w hich liave ansen or which may anse between tliem in respect
of a defined legal relationship, whetlicr contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.
(2) Tlie term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in the exchange of letters or telegrams
(3) Tlie Court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which tlie parties
have made an agreement w itliin tlie meamng of tlus article, at tlie request of one of the parties, refer the
parties to arbitration unless it finds tliat tlie said agreement is null and \oid, inoperativ e or incapable of
being performed." See 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 38-40.
Article 1(1) of the New York Con\ention provides: '"Tliis Convention shall apply to tlie recognition and
enforcement of arbitral aw ards made in tlie temton, of a State otiier tlian tlie State w here tlie recognition
and enforcement of such awards is sought, and ansing out of differences betw cen persons, w hetlier physical
or legal. It sliall also apply to awards not considered as domestic awards in tlie State where tlieir recognition
and enforcement is sought." See 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 38.
^^ See Article lof the Geneva Protocol, Supra note 15.
* See Article I(l)of tlie New York Convention. Supra note 36 ; Art III of tlie New York Convention
provides: "Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce tliem in
14
improvement, which the New York convention makes over the Geneva treaties, is the
shifting the burden of proof from the party seeking enforcement of the award to the party
opposing it/''^ All that the party seeking enforcement has to do is to supply the copy of the
arbitration agreement and the award.
The New York Convention provides for limited and exhaustive grounds for
refijsing the enforcement international arbitral awards "^' Further, these grounds for
accordance with tlie rules of procedure of the territorv' where tlie award is relied upon, under llie conditions
laid down in Uie following articles. Tliere shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or
liigher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of awards to which tins Comention applies than
are imposed on the recognition and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." See 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 40.
^^ Under tlie Gene\ a treaties an arbitral award could not be enforced unless tlie requirements mentioned
Uierein were complied wiUi and tlie burden of showing compliance was on Uie party seeking enforcement.
See Article I of Uie Gene\a Convention, Supra note 27.
^" Article IV(1) of the New York Con\ention provides: "To obtain tlie recognition and enforcement
mentioned in tlie preceding article. Uie party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at Uie Ume of
apphcaUon, supply :
a) Tlie duly auUienticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof
;
b) Tlie original agreement referred to in article II or a dulv certified copy thereof" See 330
U.N.T.S. 3. 40.
"''
Article V(l) of the New York Comention contains Uie grounds for refusing recogniUon and enforcement
of awards. These grounds are:
1 Incapacity of the parties or Uie imalidity of the agreement under Uie law to w liich Uie parties
liave agreed to submit it. If Uiere is no such indication under tliat law then under Uie law of the
countrv where Uie award was made. See Cl.( 1 )(a)
2. Violation of the due process - party against whom Uic award is sought to be invoked was not
given proper notice of the appoinunent of the arbiu-ator or Uie arbitration proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case. See Cl.(l)(b)
3. Tlie award deals wiUi a difference not contemplated b\ or not falling wiUiin the terms of Uie
submission agreement or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
agreement. See Cl.(l)(c)
4. Tlie composition of the arbitral auUiorit\' or Uie procedure was not in accordance wiUi Uie
agreement of Uic parties or failing such agreement, was not in accordance with Uie law of Uie
countr>- where Uie arbitration took place. See Cl.(l)(d)
5. Tlie award has not yet become binding on Uic parties or lias been suspended by a competent
auUiority of Uie countn- in winch or under Uie laws of which. Uiat award was made. See Cl.( l)(e)
Article V(2) of Uie Convention pro\ides: 'Recognition and enforcement of the ju-bitral award may also
be refused if Uie competent auUionty in Uie countn where Uie recognition and enforcement is subject
finds Uiat:
(a) Tlic subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbimiUon under the law
of tliat countn; or
(b) Tlie recogniUon and enforcement of the award would be contrary to Uie public policy of that
countn." See 330 U.N.T.S. 3,40-42; It is important to note that ilie language adopted by
15
refusing recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards place special emphasis on the
arbitral sifus. Recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if the arbitration
agreement was invalid under the law to which the parties have subjected it. in case there
is no indication as to this law, then under the law of the arbitral situs'*^ Violation of due
process, which is determined by the application of forum country's standards, may also
result in the denial of recognition and enforcement.'' Award may also be denied
recognition and enforcement if the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the procedure
was, failing the agreement of the parties in this regard, not in accordance with the law of
the country where the arbitration took place."'''
Article V of the New York Con\ention is pcnmssive ratlier tliaii maiidaton-. See VAN DEN
BERG Supra note 12 at 265
"" See Art. V(l)(a) of the New York Convention Supra note 41, "The invahdity of the arbitration agreement
under tlie law applicable to it pursiutnt to Article V( l)(a) has scarcely ever been invoked, and ne\er
successfully. Most cases in wluch Article V(l)(a) was in\oked concerned the assertion tliat tlie agreement
did not comph with the imiform rule of Article II regarding the form of the arbitration agreement.
Furilienriore. it appears tliat few matters left to be detennined under tlie law applicable to tlie arbitration
agreement. Finally, in tliose few cases in which tlie conflict rules of Article V(l)(a) have been applied, it
has in\ anably been found tliat tlie agreement was go\ emed by the law of the country in w hich tlie award
was made." VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 282
'^^ See Article V( 1 )(b) of tlie New York Convention Supra note 41:lt has been argued, based on Uie
relationship between articles V(l)(b) and V(l)(d). tliat article V(l)(b)constitutes an international rule which
cannot be linked to Uie national law of any countr*. "Tlus opinion is prompted b\ the desire to discard the
law of the forum which may contain parochial requirements for an orderly procedure." It must however be
noted that Uie judge before whom enforcement is sought is bound to rely on tlie requirements under his own
law. Tliough no court has ruled tliat article V(l)(l)) constitutes an international rule it has generally been
affirmed that tlie standards of due process are to be judged under the national law of the situs. See VAN
DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 298
'^ See Article V( 1 )(d) of tlie New York Con\ention Supra note 4 1 ; Tlie role of the law of the arbitral situs
regarding tlie composition of the arbitnd tribunal and arbitral procedure can be categorized as subsidiar\'
and complementan
.
Tlie role is subsidiary if the parties ha\e not pro\ ided an\lhing in respect of these
matters. In such a simation only the law of the arbitral situs is to be taken into account. Tlie role is
complementan for tliose aspects w hich lia\ e not been pro\ided for by the parties in tlieir agreement. In
such a situation tlie law of the place of arbitration fills in tlie lacunae in tlie arbitration agreement. It is
however important to note tliat the role of the law of the place of arbitration proceedings is confined to
enforcement proceedings only, tlie Convention not being applicable in tlie country of origin. Furllier. tlie
law of the country of origin plays a primary role as in majority of cases the arbitrations, including tlie
composition of the arbitral tribunal and tlic proceedings are goxerncd by this law. Failure to comply with
tlie mandatory reqmrements of tlie law of the arbitral situs will result in setting aside of the aw ard tliereby
providing a ground for refusal of recognition and enforcement. It may how ever be argued tliat the
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The New York convention also permits refusal of recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award on the ground that the award has not become binding on the parties or
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which or
under the law of which it has been made."^" To determine whether the award has become
binding on the parties or not resort has to made to the law applicable to award According
to the provisions of Article V(l)(e) the law applicable to the award is the law of the
country in which i.e. the arbitral sifus or under the law of which that award has been
made (the country of origin)."*^ The second ground for refijsing recognition and
enforcement, contained in Article V(l)(e), is that the award has been set aside or
suspended by a competent authority of the country in which or under the law of which it
was made. The Article lays down in unequivocal terms that the courts competent to set
aside or suspend the award are either those of the country in which i.e. the arbitral silus or
under the law of which the award has been made.
"The competent authority as mentioned in .Article V(l)(e) for entertaining
the action for setting aside the award is virtually always the court of the country in
which the award was made. The phrase 'or under the lew of which ' the award
requirement of compliance witli tlie mandator* proxisions of the law of the situs defeats the \er> purpose of
Article V(l)(d) wliich seeks to gi\e priman.- importance to tJie agreement of Uie parties vis-a-\is tlie law of
the countr\ w here Uie arbitration took place Tliis argument hovsever leads to a ver> confusing and
complicated situation. If tJie agreement of tJie parties is given prime importance and Uie mandatory
provisions of the situs are not complied wiUi tlie. the courts of the situs would not hesitate to set aside the
award tliereby providing a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement. Wliere how ever the mandator.-
requirements of tJie law of tlie country where the proceedings took place are taken into account and Uie
agreement of Uie parties is given a secondar>' position Uie courts of the place of enforcement may deny
recognition and enforcement on Uie ground Uiat the convention was intended to gi\e priman^ importance to
Uie agreement of the parties \'is-a'-\is Uic law of the arbitral situs. It has howe\er. now been settled Uiat Uie
irregularity of Uie composition of Uie arbitral tribunal or Uie procedure has to be judged in Uie light of the
agreement of Uie parties and if the parties agreement does not contain an\ provision regarding or fails to
completely deal w iUi Uie composition of the tribunal or Uie procedure only then Uie law of the arbitral situs
is to be looked into and onlv to Uie extent not provided for bv the parties See VAN DEN BERG Supra note
14 at 322-331.
'^^ See Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention Supra note 41
''' VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 339.
17
was made refers to the theoretical case that on the basis of an agreement of the
parties the award is governed by an arbitration law which is different from the
arbitration law of the country in which the award was made."
By providing limited and exhaustive grounds for refusing recognition and
enforcement of awards and, by removing grounds like the mistake of law or fact by the
arbitrator, the New York Convention ensures that there is no review of the award on
merits. ^^^This however does not mean that the courts are completely precluded from
looking into the award even it is for the purpose of ascertaining whether the grounds for
denying recognition and enforcement, which are alleged to be present are actually present
or not. For instance when the award is challenged on the ground that it deals with matters
not contemplated by the terms of the submission agreement, the court has to look into the
merits of the award to ascertain the credibility of the allegation Other significant
improvements that the New York Convention makes over the Geneva Treaties is the
abolishment of the double execquatur and shifting the burden of proof, of the absence of
the grounds sufficient for reftjsing enforcement, from the party seeking enforcement and,
establishing the existence of these grounds, to the party against whom enforcement is
sought.
'°
Like the Geneva Treaties the New York Convention also has its inherent
shortcomings and there are qualifications to the 'internationalism' the convention seeks to
''
Id. at 350.
^^ See Id. 265, 269.
'^SeeMat271.
Article V( 1 ) of the New York Con\ ention provides: "Recogrution and enforcement of tlie aw ard inay be
refused, at tlie request of tlie part> against u horn it is in\ okcd. only if the party furnishes to Uie competent
autliority w here recognition and enforcement is sought .proof tltat " ; It is important to note tliat under
CI. (2) tlie court may refuse enforcement on its own motion if it is of the opinion tliat tlic subject matter of
tlie dispute is not capable of being arbitrated or tliat tlie eiiforcemcnt would be contrar> to tlie public policy
of the country of enforcement. See Supra note 4 1 . VAN DEN BERG, Supra note 1 4 at 9.
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achieve. The convention gives its member countries a right to make two reservations. The
first reservation pertains to the requirement of reciprocity, while the second may be called
the commercial reservation.
'
a) The Reciprocity Requirement
The New York convention gives its signatories freedom to reserve the right to
apply the convention to the awards rendered in the territories of other contracting
countries only. The extent to which the contracting countries subscribe to the reciprocity
requirement, has the effect of narrowing the scope of the convention. The countries
subscribing to the reciprocity requirement in effect agree to give effect to convention
awards only as opposed to any foreign award. In other words these countries agree to
enforce awards made in the territory of member countries alone This means that if the
country where the proceedings took place and the award was made is not a member to the
Convention but the country where the award is required to be enforced requires the
reciprocity requirement as a condition of enforcement, the Convention is not applicable
and it may become extremely difficult if not impossible to get the award enforced.
b) Commercial Relationship
Art. I (3) of the convention also permits a member country to declare that it will
apply the convention only to disputes arising out of legal relationships considered to be
" Article 1(3) of the New York Con\cntion pro\ ides: "When signing , ratifying or acceding to litis
Convention, or notifying extension under article X hereof, any State inay on tJie basis of reciprocity declare
that it will apply the Com ention to tlie recognition and enforcement of awards inade only in tlie territoiA of
other Contracting State. It niay also declare that it will apply tlie convention only to differences arising out
of legal relationsliips, w hetlier contractual or not, w Inch are considered as commercial imder Uie national
law of the State makuig such declaration. See 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 38; See REDFERN & HUNTER. Supra note
9 at 458; See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 9; It is important to note that tliis commercial reservation
also featured in tlie Geneva Protocol.
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commercial under its commercial laws. Like the requirement of reciprocity this
reservation also has the effect of narrowing the scope of the convention it creates the
problems of uncertainty, which the Convention was intended to overcome, with each
contracting country free to give its own interpretation to the expression 'commercial
relationship' As a consequence even an award made in a member country may not be
able to qualify for enforcement in another member country if the relationship is not
deemed to be 'commercial' under the national laws of the enforcing state. In other words
the award may be denied enforcement even in cases where the reciprocity requirement is
satisfied thereby making it imperative to have regard to the definition of 'commercial
relationship" under the national laws of both the arbitral situs and the country of
enforcement^^ The problem is illustrated by the two cases that came up before the Indian
courts. ^"^ In Indian Organic Chemicals Limited w. Subsidiary J (US), Subsidiary 2 ( US)
and Chemtex Fibers Inc. (Parent Company) (US)^'^ the single judge of the Bombay High
Court held;
"In my opinion, in order to invoke the provision of Sect. 3[of the convention], it is
not enough to establish that an agreement is commercial. It must also be
established that it is commercial by virtue of a provision of law or an operative
legal principle in force in India.""
5:
53
REDFERN &. HUNTER. Supra note 9 at 459, 460.
Tliough in both tliese cases the issue was raised at the time of enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate
nevertheless tliey are illustrative of the problem as practically the same issues are raised at llie time of
enforcement.
^'^ IV Yearbook; Commercial Arbitration. 271.
" Id. 212: It IS important to note tliat tins \ic\v of the learned single judge of the Bombay High Court was
not upheld by the division bench of the Bombay High Court. See AIR 1983 Bom 36.
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In Union ofIndia v. LeifHocgh & Co. and Others (Norway) ' Indian courts once
again had the opportunity to interpret the expression 'commercial relationship' In this
case the Gujarat High Court was of the opinion:
"It cannot be argued successfully without violence to the language that the charter
party contract for the carriage of goods by sea is not commercial in nature The
term 'commerce' strictly relates to dealings with foreign nations, colonies, etc,
{vide: The Webster's Third Ne\i International Dictionary at p. 456) It is a word
of largest import and takes in its sweep all the business and trader transactions in
any of their forms including transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of
commodities between citizens of different countries {vide: IVe/ton v. Missouri
(1875)91 US 275)""
C. The European Convention
In the year 1961, under the aegis of the Trade Development Committee of the UN
Economic Commission for Europe, the European Convention on International Arbitration
was signed at Geneva. This convention is applicable to arbitration agreements "concluded
for the purposes of settling disputes arising from international trade between physical or
legal persons having, when concluding the agreement, their habitual place of residence or
their seat in different Contracting States".'^ Though the Convention was initially intended
to deal with the problems of establishing and operating procedures for disputes arising
^^ IX Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration 405.
-" Id. at 407.
58
See Article I(l)(a) of the European Convention XV Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration 624, 627.
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out of trading agreements between European countries it is open to accession by the non-
European countries.
^'^
Article I (1)' of the European Convention has the effect of dehmiting its scope as
the only requirement for the application of the Convention is that at the time of
concluding the agreement to arbitrate the usual place of residence of the parties should
have been in any of the contracting countries. It is, however, important to note that under
the European Convention the parties to the arbitration agreement must belong to different
contacting countries.''' In this regard the European Convention differs from the New
York Convention and its field of application can be said to be narrower than that of the
New York Convention in this regard. However the European Convention contains
provisions for stages of arbitration, like organization and functioning of the arbitral
tribunal, to which the New York Convention does not apply and in this respect it can be
said to have a broader scope than the New York Conventions^
Where the arbitration agreement and the award fall within the field of operation of
both the conventions, they can be said to complement each other. Though the nature of
relationship between the two conventions, in cases of concurrent applicability, has been
Article X of the European Convention provides: "(1) Tltis Convention is open for signature or accession
by countries members of tlie Economic Comiuission for Europe and countnes adnutted to tlie Commission
in a consultative capacity under paragraph 8 of the Commission "s tenn of reference.
(2)Such countnes as may participate in certain actixilies of the Economic Commission for European
accordance with paragraph 1 lof tlie Commissions terms of reference ma> become Contracting Parties to
tliis Convention by acceding tliere to after its entr> into force
(...)" XV Yearbook. Commercial Arbitration, 624, 655.
^° See Supra note 58.
See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 94: Tlus requirement was also to be found in tlie Geneva
Treaties but not in tlie New York Con\ cntion.
"See/^.
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interpreted by some courts and authors in terms of conflict of treaties' , it is not actually
so. The numerous references to the New York Convention, made in the preamble of the
European Convention, lend support to this inference. ^' The position is substantiated by
the similarity in the definitions of the arbitration agreement as contained in the two
conventions '" Absence of any enforcement provisions in the European Convention
further supports its complimentary nature A Party seeking enforcement of the award
falling under both the European and the New York Convention thus has to comply with
the requirements of Article IV^^ and the party resisting the enforcement of the award
^^ In tlie first case concerning lliis question, request for enforcement of tlie award was made in Austria
(Bundcsgerichtsof, May 25. 1970 (F.R. genn. no. 7)). Both Austna and Germany are members to both tJie
New York Con\ention and Uie European Con\ ention. In tlus tlie dispute arose from the sale of u ool fibre
by the Austrian finn to tlie Gemian enterprise Tlus sale was on tlie basis of sales confimution which was
not returned b> tlie latter. Arbitration commenced b> tlie Austnan seller, in accordance w itli the arbitral
clause contained in tlie sales confimiation. at the Vienna Commodit\ E.\cli;uige resulted in an award in
favor of the Austrian seller. Tlie enforcement proceedings, before the Gerniim Courts, were resisted b_\ the
buyer on the grounds lliat the arbitration agreement was not in writing. Tlie validir\' of the arbitration clause
was. however, upheld by the Geniian Supreme Court relying on the provisions of Article I(2)(a) of Uie
European Con\ention. An arbitration agreement need not be in w nting under tlic GeruKm law and a similar
provision existed imder tlie Austnan law . In resorting to the European Con\ ention the Geniian Supreme
Court relied upon the principle of lex posterior and obsen ed : " . . . [the European Con\ention | prevails as
being of a younger date over llie New York Com ention." See VAN DEN BERG. Supro note 14 at 97
The use of the principle of lex posterior. howe\er. misconstrues tlie relationslup between tlie two
Con\entions. Tlie enforcement of the award cannot be sought imder tlie European Coinention alone as it
complements tlie New York Con\ ention. It is further important to note that llie Europemi Con\ ention does
not contain any express pro\isions concerning Uie enforcement of aw ard and relies on oUier treaties and
conventions for tliis purpose. See infra notes 73. 74 . Also see XI Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration. 472-
474: For autliors taking tlie so-called 'conflict approach' See generally F. MAJOROS. Les Conventions
internationales en matiere de droit prive
. 3 15-.3 19 (Pans 1976).
*^ See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 94.
Article I (2)(a) of the European Convention provides: "the term "arbitration agreement" shrill mean eitlier
an arbitral clause in a contract or an ju-bitration agreement, tlie contract and arbitration agreement being
signed by the parties, or contained in an exchange of letters, telegrams, or in a communication by a
telepnnter and. in relations between states w hose laws do not require tliat an arbitration agreement be inade
in writing
.
any arbitration agreement concluded in the form authorized by these laws." See XV Yearbook:
Commercial Arbitration 624, 627; See Article 11(2) New York Convention Supra note 35.
66
67
See Infra notes 73, 74.
See Supra note 40.
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6X
may invoke the grounds of refusal enumerated in Article V of the New York
Convention.
^^
Like the New York Convention, the European Convention also contains limited
grounds for the setting aside of awards, ^'^ which are incidentally similar to those
contained in Art. V (1) of the New York Convention and place a similar emphasis on the
arbitral situs.^^A noteworthy feature of the European Convention is that an award may
qualify for recognition and enforcement in member countries even if it has been set aside
in the country where it was made. This is so if the award has been set aside on the
grounds which may be legal and valid in such a country but are not contained in the
Convention. ^^ In this context the European Convention goes much beyond the New York
^* See Supra note 4 1
.
*^ See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 94-95.
™ Article IX(1) of the European Convention provides: "Tlie setting aside in a Contracting State of an
arbitral award co\ered by llus Con\cntion sliall onh constitute a ground for refusal of recognition and
enforcement in anotlier Contracting State where such setting aside took place in a State in which or under
tlie law of which, tlie award lias been made and for one of tlie follow ing reasons:
(a) tlie parties to Uie arbitration agreement were, under tiie law applicable to Uieni. under some incapacity
or tlie said agreement is not \alid under the law to which tlie piulies ha\ e subjected it or. failing any
indication thereoa under llie law of tlie country where tlie award was made; or
(b) tlie party requesting tlie setting aside of the aw ard w as not gi\ en proper noUce of Uie appointment of
the arbitrator or of tlie arbitration proceedings or was otlierwise unable to present liis case; or
(c) tlie award deals witli a difference not contemplated b\ or not falling within ilie terms of the submission
to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond tlie scope of the submission to arbitration,
provided tliat, if tlie decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from tliose not
submitted, the part of die award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration need not be
set aside.
(d) the composition of tlie arbitral autliorit> or of the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of tlie parties, or failing such agreement witli tlie provisions of Article VI of tliis Convention."
XV Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration 624, 652.
' See Supra note 4 1
.
" Under tlie Article V(l)(e) of Uie New York Convention an award may be refused recognition and
enforcement if it lias been set aside in tlie state where it was rendered. Tins setting aside of the award may
be on any ground set fortli in Uie arbitration law of that state. See Supra note 41. The European Con\ention
however places a hmitation on Uie right to invoke Uie ground set forUi in iuiicle V(l)(e) of the New York
Comention. Under Uic European Con\cntion tliis pro\ision can be in\oked if Uie ground on winch Uie
award has been set aside finds mention in Uie European ConvenUon as one of the grounds for refusing
recognition and enforcement of the awards. Article IX (2) of the European convenUon provides: "In
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Convention. Though the European convention contains grounds for the setting aside of
arbitral awards, it does not provide for nor guarantees the recognition and enforcement of
awards. It addresses the questions of recognition and enforcement form the perspective
of their relation to setting aside of the awards. " For recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral awards the European Convention relies on other international treaties and
conventions, for instance the New York Convention of 1958 and to the extent the
contracting parties are covered by both the New York and the European Convention, it
can be said to be a supplement to the New York Convention
D. The Washington Convention
The Washington Convention also known as the International Convention on the
settlement of Investment Disputes was concluded at Washington in the year 1965. The
International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established in
Washington pursuant to this convention to promote the resolution of investment disputes
relations between Contracting States lliat are also parties to the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of lO"' June 1958, paragraph lof Uiis Article hmiis tlie
apphcation of Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention solely to the cases of setting aside set out under
paragraph 1 abo\e." Apart from tins express pro\ ision Uus mference may also be draw n to some extent
from tlie provisions of Article 1X(1) of the European Convention which provide: "Tlie setting aside m a
Contracting State of an arbitral award co\ered by the Con\ention shall only constitute a groimd for refusal
of recognition or enforcement in anotlicr Contracting Stale w here such setting aside took place in a State in
which or imder tlie law of which, tlie award has been made and for one of the follow ing reasons ...."; See
VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 95. 96: See REDFERN & HUNTER, Supra note 9 at 466: See XV
Yearbook; Commercial Arbitration 650-655.
15 Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration 624. 650-651: Also See XI Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration,
472-473.
" See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 95: XI Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration 473: See generally
REDFERN & HUNTER. Supra note 9 at 466.
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between countries and national of other countries. " The ICSID arbitrations are governed
solely by the rules and regulations framed under the Washington Convention and take
place at the ICSID facilities in Washington only. " It is important to note that Convention
governs arbitrations relating to disputes that arise directly out of an investment by the
national of a contracting country in another contracting country with the parties to the
77
dispute having agreed in writing to submit the dispute to ICSID arbitration. The awards
made by the ICSID are binding on the parties and are not subject to appeal or any other
remedy except for those provided for in the Convention. ^*^ The Washington Convention
75
76
For text of the convcnLion see 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 99; Article I (2) of the Washington Con\cntion pro\idcs: "The
purpose of the Centre shall be to proxidc facilitjcs for conciliation and arbitration of nnestinent disputes
between Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in accord;mce witJi tlie provisions of
Uus ConvcntJon." See 575 U.N.T.S. 160, 162.
"
Article 25(1) of the Washington Convention provides: "The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any
legal dispute arising out of an in\estincnt. between a Contracting State ( or any constituent sub dnision or
agcncN of a Contracting State designated to tlie Centre b> that State) iuid a national of another Contracting
State, which tlic parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre When the parties ha\e
gi\en tlieir consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. " See 575 U.N.T.S. 160. 174
^^ Article 53 of the Waslungton Convention provides: "(l)Tlic award shall be binding on the parties and
shall not be subject to aiiy appeal or an\ other remedy except those pro\ ided for in this Con\ention. Each
party shall abide by and comply w ith the terms of the award except to the extent tliat the enforcement shall
lune been stayed pursuant to tlie relevant provisions of this Convention.
(2) For tlic purposes of tliis section, "award" shall include any decision interpreting, revising or annulling
such award pursmmt to Articles 50, 51 or 52." See 575 U.N.T.S. 160. 194
Tlie relevant provisions of the Convention containing these remedies or the grounds of challenge are as
under:
Article 50(1) pro\ides: " If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to llie meaning or scope of an
award, eitlicr pjuly may at request interpretation of the award b> an application in wnting addressed to tlie
Sccretar>-General." See 575 U.N.T.S. 160. 190
Article 51(1) provides: "Either party may request revision of the award by an application in writing
addressed to tlie Secrct:u7»' General on tlie ground of discover* of some fact of such nature as decisively to
affect the awiird. pro\ ided that when the awiu-d was rendered lliat fact was unknown to tlic Tnbunal and to
the applicant and tluit the applicant's ignorance of that fact was not due to his negligence." Sec 575
U.N.T.S. 160. 190
Article 52(1) pro\ides: "Either piirty may request annulment of the award by an application in wnting
addressed to tlic Secretarx -General on one or more of the following grounds:
(a) tliat tlie tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that tlie Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of the member of the TribuiKil;
(d)that lliere lias been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or
(e) tliat tlie award has failed to state tlie reasons on which it is based " See 575 U.N T.S. 160. 192.
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imposes an obligation on the contracting countries to recognize these awards as binding
and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by the award within their territories as if
they were the final judgments of their courts
'
The Washington Convention differs from the New York convention in the sense
that it excludes the application of the national law on arbitration as the ICSID arbitrations
are governed solely by the rules and regulations framed under the Convention. Though
the New York Convention does not exclude, form its scope of application, the investment
disputes between countries and nationals of other countries it is assumed that the
Washington Convention applies once the parties have fijlfilled the requirements
pertaining to jurisdiction and the written agreement submitting the dispute to ICSID
arbitration^'. It cannot, however, be said that there is a conflict between the New York
and the Washington Conventions. Where the dispute falls within the scope of both the
Conventions it is disadvantageous to submit it to the New York Convention as under the
Washington Convention the award is binding on the member countries and there is no
possibility of resisting enforcement by asserting any ground of refijsal But if
enforcement of the award is not possible for one of the reasons provided in the
Article 54(1) of the Washington Convention proxides: "Each Contracting State sliall recognize an award
rendered pursuant to tliis con\ ention as binding and enforce the pecuniar) obligations imposed by that
award witliin its territories as if it were a final judgement of a court in that State A Contracting State wiUi a
federal constitution m;i> enforce such an award in or ilirough its federal courts and ma> provide tliat such
courts shall treat Uie award as if it were a final judgement of the courts of a constituent state." See 575
U.N.T.S. 160, 194.
*° See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 99.
^' See Article 25 of the Washington Convention, Supra note 77; See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at
98-99.
*- VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 99.
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Washington Convention the New York Convention can still be applied. The
Washington Convention can thus be said to fall under both traditional principles
governing the conflict of treaties i.e. lex specialis and lex posterior ' . Further it is
important to note that an arbitration agreement referring to or an award made under the
'Additional Facilitv"^*' of ICSID falls under the New York Convention.^
E. Panama Convention
In the January of 1975 the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, also known as the Panama Convention, was entered into
between the Governments of Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Panama
Convention which is modeled after the New York Convention, though not entirely, does
not contains any definition as to its scope or the field of application. As regards the
*^
Tliis application of the New York Con\ cntion takes place b> \ irtue of tlic pnnciple of maximum
efficiency. See Id.
^^ A bod>' of law dealing wiUi a particular or specific as opposed to a general subject or topic.
^^ lex posterior derogat priori : A later statute takes away tlie effect of a prior one. But tlie later statute must
either expressly repeal, or be manifestly repugnant to. tlie earlier one.
^^ The Additional Facility ' to ICSID was set up in 1978 in order to provide for tlie arbitration under tlie
auspices of ICSID which fall outside the scope of the Waslungton Con\ cntion. Tliis 'Additional Facility'
can be used only if the underlying transaction has features tliat distinguish it from an ordinar. commercial
transaction. Tlie submission to the "Additional Facility" cannot take place without tlie approval of tlie
Secretary General of Uie ICSID. FurUicr these arbiUations arc to be held and tlie award has to be rendered
in Uie member states of the New York Coinention. See A. Brochcs. ""The "Additional Facility" of the
International Centre for Settlement of ln\estment Disputes". IV Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration.
373,379.
VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 99.
REDFERN & HUNTER. Supro note 9 at 467.
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arbitration awards the Panama Convention provides only limited grounds of challenge
which are almost identical with those contained in Article V of the New York
Convention. As can be inferred from the expression inter-American' for the application
of the convention the award must be made in the territory of a member country and
should relate to an international transaction. Though it is unclear that the parties be
subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting countries, as a condition for the application
of the Convention, it can be safely assumed that this condition is implied in view of the
traditional Latin American tendency to protect national interests and to require
reciprocity. This at times may lead to inapplicability of the Convention if the situs is a
non-member country^' It is important to note that the Panama Convention does not make
any provisions for the action and procedure for the enforcement of the arbitration
^^ Article 5 of Uie Panama Convention provides: "(1) The recognition and execution of the decision niay be
refused, at tlie request of tlie party against w luch it is made, only if such part> is able to pro\ e to tlie
competent authority of the state in which recognition and execution are requested:
a. TliiU tlie parties to the agreement were subject to some incapacity under tlic applicable law or
tliat tlie agreement is not \ alid under tlie law to w Inch tlic parties ha\ e submitted it. or. such law is not
specified, under tlie law^ the law of the state in w hich tlie decision was made: or
b. Tliat tlie parts- against which the arbitral decision lias been made was not duly notified of the
appointment of tlie arbitrator or tlie arbitration procedure to be followed, or was unable, for any other
reason to present liis defense; or
c. Tliat tlie decision concerns a dispute not envisaged in the agreement betw een tlie parties to
submit to arbitration; nevertlieless. if tlie pro\isions of the decision tliat refer to issues submitted to
arbitration can be separated from tliose not submitted to arbitration . the former may be recognized and
executed; or
d. Tliat tlie constitution of tlie arbitral tribunal or Uie arbitration procedure has not been carried out
in accordance with Uie terms of the agreement signed by the parties or, in die absence of such agreement,
tliat Uie constitution of the arbitration tribunal or tlie arbitration procedure kis not been earned out in
accordance with tlie law of the state where tlie arbitration took place; or
e. Tliat tlie decision is not yet biding on the parties or has been imnullcd or suspended b> a
competent auUiority of the state in w Inch, or according to the law of w hich. Uie decision has been made.
(2) Tlie recogniuon and execution of an arbitral decision may also be refused if the competent auUiority of
Uie state in winch recognition and enforcement is sought finds :
a. That Uie subject of Uie dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under the law of Uiat state; or
b. Tliat Uie recognition or execution of Uie decision would be contrar> to Uie public policy ('odre
public") of tliat state." See 111 Yearbook: Commercial Arbitration .15-16.
^ See Supra note 41.
'' See VAN DEN BERG, Supra note 14 at 102
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agreements and conditions to be fulfilled by the party seeking enforcement ' In case of
concurrent applicability of the New York Convention and the Panama Convention it is
the Panama Convention which prevails by virtue of its article 3 which provides that ''In
the absence of the agreement between the parties, the arbitration shall be conducted in
accordance with the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commission." It can
however be said that the New York Convention applies in those cases where the Panama
Convention fails to provide an adequate solution. It is important to note that in such cases
New York Convention applies to the exclusion of the Panama Convention as the Panama
Convention is not conceived as a complement to the New York Convention and no
combination of different bases for enforcement is possible. In such situations the
application of the New York Convention is also warranted by the principle of maximum
efficacy.
''Id.
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CHAPTER III
Judicial Assistance Available
Introduction
Powers possessed by an arbitral tribunal are limited and none of them equals the
sovereign powers of the state irrespective of whether it concerns proper and efficient
conduct of arbitration proceedings or the enforcement of awards. Effectiveness of
arbitration as a system of dispute resolution thus depends on the cooperation and
assistance it receives from the judiciary of the place i.e. the country or state of arbitration.
The extent to which the national courts of the country of arbitration can assist in
enforcing the award and/or proper and efficient conduct of arbitration proceedings
depends on and is regulated by the national law of the country within whose jurisdiction
the arbitration proceedings are conducted.'^ This judicial assistance to arbitration as a
mechanism of dispute resolution can be studied at two stages:^''
1. Before the award is rendered; and
2. After the award has been rendered.
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Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause. 6 Journal of International Arbitration 65.
72(1989).
-' REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 306.
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A. Before The Award Is Rendered
The judicial assistance, from the courts of the country where the arbitration takes
place, to the arbitral process, before the award is made can be further categorized into
three stages:
a) Interim Relief
The need for interim relief addressing the needs of party for immediate and
temporary protection of rights or property, which form the subject matter of arbitration, is
compelling and is generally recognized and accepted though the means of enforcing
compliance are ominous in their absence. ^^ Under the general principles of international
law the court of the country where the arbitration is conducted is the competent court to
grant any interim relief
In instances where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted the
application for interim relief has to be addressed to the national courts of the place of
arbitration which are competent to grant interim relief The power to order interim relief
in such circumstances has traditionally been viewed as a part of the lex arhitn. In these
circumstances the courts require the applicant to show the compelling need for not
waiting for the tribunal to be established in order to grant the interim relief
^^
^- REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 306.
''Id.
^' Tliough tlie arbitral tribunal can issue directions to llie piirties tliere isn't really much tliat it can do witli
regard to ensunng compliance \vitl\ tJiese directions. See infra notes 100, 101 aiid 102.
Da\id E. Wagoner. Interim Relief In International Arbitration: Enforcement a Substantial Problem, 51
OCT Disp. Resol. J. 68, 69.
'^
Id. at 69, See generally REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 79,80; See generally D. Alan Redfem.
Arbitration And Tlie Courts: Intenm Measures Of Protection - Is The Tide About To Turn:', 30 Te.\. Intl
L.J. 71 at 83, 84
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Where however, the arbitral tribunal is in existence when the relief is sought the
application tor relief needs to be made to the arbitral tribunal. National laws of most of
the countries confer on the arbitral tribunal powers for the protection and preservation oi^
rights and property which form the subject matter of the dispute. Where the subject
matter of the dispute is in possession of one of the parties to the dispute the arbitral
tribunal can certainly make orders for its preservation These orders for the protection
and preservation of the subject matter of arbitration are in the form of directions to the
parties and absent the power of holding the recalcitrant party in contempt, these
directions suffer from their inherent limitations and shortcomings It is, however,
important to note that the courts generally defer to the directions given by the tribunal.
Where however, this subject matter is in possession of third parties having no connection
what so ever with the arbitration clause or the submission agreement, the arbitral tribunal
is completely poweriess. '°^ The remedy therefore has to come from the court system of
the country, where proceedings are conducted, operating under its national law.
'*' Tlie parlies having agreed to liave their differences arbitrated are deemed to have submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal and bound by tlie orders made by the tribunal during tlie conduct of the
proceedings and by the award Uiereafter.
'*''
It is important to note tliat if a part>- to the arbitration goes against the directions of tlie tribunal tlie
maximum tlial a tribunal can do in such a situation is to draw an adverse inference, in tlie award, against
such a party. The arbitral tnbunal does not possess any of the punitive powers, such as contempt possessed
and exercised by the national courts. Tliis often tempts the parties to by pass llic tnbunal and directly
approach tlie courts for any intenni relief; See Wagoner Supra note 98 at 69: The law governing tlie
arbitration agreement may introduce additional powers into that agreement by express enactment. English
arbitration law is pjirticularlv enamoured of deeming' provisions into arbitration agreements. For instance
unless contrar> intention is expressed tliercin. e\ er> arbitration agreement is deemed to contain a provision
tliat the parties to the arbitration agreement shall do all tilings which tlie arbitrator may require tliem to do
during Uie proceedings. Sec Arbitration Act 1950, 14 Geo. 6. ch. 27, § 12(1) (Eiig.)
Tlie contractual nature of arbitration is considered to dcpriv c the arbitral tribunal of anv pow er what so
ever over tlie tliird parties who are aliens or strangers to the arbitration agreement.; Also see Wagoner
Supra note 98 at 69
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Further it is important to note that situations may arise where the arbitral tribunal
is in existence but does not possess the powers to grant the rehef claimed The dividing
line between the powers of the arbitration tribunals and the courts apart from being
dependent on the nature of the remedy sought varies from one system to another and
however tolerant a system of law may be it is unlikely to confer on the arbitral tribunals
the powers to order the draconian measures of protection, such as injunctions and
attachments, which have become a regular feature of modern litigation. These are and are
likely to remain in the reserved domain of the national courts operating under the national
law of the country. '°^ Apart from this a distinction also needs to be maintained between
these powers and the powers that may be exercised concurrently by the courts and the
arbitration tribunals. This distinction varies from one country to another. Under the
English law an arbitral tribunal can make orders for the inspection of the property which
forms the subject matter of reference. Such an application can also be made to the court
having jurisdiction over the relevant property and hands. Further this application has to be
made to the courts alone where the property or funds is in possession of the third parties
over whom the arbitral tribunal has no powers.'^"*
The extent ofjudicial support available to the arbitral process varies from one
country to another. While some countries are more than willing to exercise their powers
to assist the arbitral tribunals in preserving and protecting the rights and property pending
final disposal on merits
,
in other countries it appears that the New York Convention bars
'""^ D. Alan Redfern Supra note 99 at 85.
"^' REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 307. 308.
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any pre-award attachment of properties or interference by the courts in any other form.
This problem is not encountered in those countries where the national law specifically
provides for the grant of interim relief
b) Supportive Role
The supportive role played by the courts of the -sv/z/.v of arbitration can be seen at
all stages of the arbitration process - beginning, during and at the end. At the beginning
'"""
In Uie United States tJiere is some contro\ers\' over whetlier or not pre-arbitration av\ard attachment of
assets by a court is barred on tlie basis that tlie New York Con\ ention reqmres that all mauers be referred to
be decided b\ the arbitral tribunal unless tlie agreement to arbitrate is null and \oid. inoperali\e or
incapable of being performed. One of the views taken is tliat tlie courts of tlie Umted States ha\c no power
to grant interim relief Some courts have interpreted the words "shall refer"" appejinng m An 11(3) of the
New York Con\ ention to mean tliat their subject matter junsdiction over a matter that Hills witlun Uie
purview of the New York Con\ ention is limited oiil\ to the extent of ordering tlie panics to arbitration and
later on enforcing tlie award made b>' the arbitral tribunal. In McCrcary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A.
501 F. 2d. 1032 (3d Cir. 1974). it was held by the tlurd circuit tliat an order affecting foreign parties" assets
in tlie United states must be \acated as die parties had agreed to ;u"bitrate. The court was of the opinion tliat
die New York Convention had divested the courts to enter an attachment order. It noted die difference
between die language of Chapter 1. section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act which provides: "If any suit or
proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the U.S. upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration, die court in w hich such suit is pending, upon being satisfied die
issue in\ol\ed in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been held in accordance
with die tenns of die agreement, providing die applicimt for the stay is not in default in proceeding widi
such arbitration " and Article 11(3) of die New York Con\ ention to mean tliat tlie courts were powerless to
order intenm measures in Uie case before die court. The court was of the opinion tliat tlie part) seeking
attachment was attempting to by pass tlie agreed method of resolving disputes. Tlie court was furtlier of the
opinion lliat the purpose of the enactment of Pub. L. 91-368, permitting removal of all cases (from Uie
courts) falling wiUiin Uie tenns of Uie treat), was to pre\eiit the \ag;u"ies of state law from impeding its full
implementation. Pennitting a resort to foreign attaclunent in breach of Uie agreement being inconsistent
with diat purpose. Tliis reasoning oiMcCreary was subsequenth followed in Metropolitan World Tanker
Corp. V. P.X. Pertambangan Mmjakdangas Bwni Sasiunal All ¥ . Supp. 2 (S.D.N. Y. \915). LT.A.D.
Associates, Inc. v. Podar Bros. 636 F.2d 75 (4'*' Cir. 1981). and Uien by the New York Court of Appeals in
Coopers v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A. 57 N.Y.2d 408 wherein die Court of Appeals opined Uiat in
following McCreary it was minimizing uncertainty of enforcing arbiU~dtion agreements and to avoid die
vaganes of foreign law for international traders. In Carolina Power ct Light Co. v. Uramex 451 F. Supp.
1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977) Uie court was of die opinion Uiat Uie tliat Uie New York Convendon does not depnve
die national courts of the junsdiction to grant intenm relief; See generally Dana H. Freyer. Practical
Considerations In Drafting Dispute Resolution Provisions In International Commercial Contracts: A U.S.
Perspective. N97 AICB ABA - LGLED B - 75at 90 ; See generallv D. Alan Redfern Supra note 99 at 75.
76(1995).
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the court's support to the arbitral process takes the form of enforcing the agreement to
arbitrate and/or the estabhshment of the arbitral tribunal
Apart from the national law on arbitration, various international conventions play
a very important role in the enforcement of the arbitration agreement If the situs of
arbitration is a country member to the New York Convention the national courts
would, in accordance with the agreement to arbitrate, refer the parties to arbitration
unless they find that the agreement to arbitrate is void, invalid or incapable of being
performed. At the same time it may be inferred, from the fact that these countries are
party to the New York Convention that these countries in general have a national policy
favoring arbitration which is reflected in their national laws.
As for the appointment of arbitrator or arbitrators, as the case may be, the
assistance of courts is needed principally where the parties are not able to reach an
agreement as to such appointment and the arbitration clause or the submission agreement
does not confer an express power on any party to make such an appointment. In such a
situation the only alternative available is to seek the assistance of the national courts of
the situs of arbitration as under the principles of international law the national courts of
the arbitral situs possess the necessary jurisdiction and power to enforce the arbitration
agreement and/or appoint the arbitral tribunal. '°^
Therefore, in cases where the place of arbitration is specified in the arbitration
agreement there is no confijsion as to which courts have the jurisdiction and power to
"'"^ See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 309.
It is important to note tliat tJie New York Convention replaces tlie Geneva Treaties as between states tliat
ha\'e signed both the conventions. It is furtlicr important to note tlwt almost all of the worlds' developed
and business nations are part> to tJie New York Con\ ention.
'°*' Wagoner. Supra note 98 at 68. 69.
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enforce the agreement or appoint the arbitration tribunal Where however, the arbitration
clause or the submission agreement does not contain any mention of the place of
arbitration the factors that may convince the court to take jurisdiction include:
1. The law governing the substantive issues is the law of the state of that
court, or
2. The respondent is within the jurisdiction of that court, or
3. The respondent has assets within the jurisdiction of that court.
Arbitrators apply broad rules of evidence and discovery, based on general
relevance and reliability standards and are not required to follow the strict rules of
procedure. It can therefore be said that in international arbitration there is a great deal of
flexibility or uncertainty as regards the procedure to be followed by the arbitral
tribunal,"" The parties are generally free to agree, either in the arbitration agreement or
after the commencement of the arbitration, on the procedure to be followed for discovery
and evidentiary requirements.'" If however the parties do not reach any agreement to that
effect the applicable law, which is the law of the situs, casts considerable influence as to
the extent of availability of discovery and evidentiary rules. This influence which the law
"^'' REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 2 12
"" Sigvard Jarvin, The Place of Arbitration, 1990 Y.B. Swed. & Intl Arb., 92
' '
'
Tlie principle of part>' autonomy is qualified only by the requirements of applicable mandatory law . Tlie
mandatory applicable law is ordinarily either the law of the place of arbitration.: Tliere is great difference
between llie adversanal common law system imd the inquisitorial ci\ il law system as regards tlie approach
to disco\ ery and evidentiary requirements. Though the parties in arbitration arc generally free to agree on
tlie rule of procedure regarding disco\cry and evidentiar\ concerns, effectiveness of their choice depends
on tlie whetlier tlie arbitration proceedings are go\ erned by the common law or tlie civil law system of law
.
Tlie extent to which one svstem or tlie otlier will applv. liowexer. depends on tlie place of arbitration. See
Id. at 92-93.
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of the situs may have on the availabihty of discovery and evidentiary procedures
depends "on the substantive legal provisions that address the following matters:
1. the authority of the arbitrators to order pre-hearing discovery and to
request the production of evidence at the arbitral hearing;
2. the authority of courts to enforce discovery orders issued by the arbitral
tribunal, and
3. the authority of courts to order discovery in aid of arbitration at the request
01 a party.
The importance of court assistance pertaining to discovery and evidentiary
procedures is further highlighted in antitrust cases which ''can rarely, if ever, be proved
by the plaintiff from his own knowledge of documents. All the questions of the
defendant's motives and conduct are necessarily in possession of the defendant.'' It is
not possible to determine the definition of competitive markets in absence of any
reference to the defendant's materials or the materials and documents in possession of the
third parties.""* Though expert testimony is of help it still may not be possible to prove
"^ See Daneil A. Zeft. Tlie Applicability Of State International Arbitration Statutes And The Absence Of
Significant Preemption Concerns. 22 N.C.J. Int'l. & Com. Reg. 705, 755-756.
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Sig\ard Jarvin. Supra note 1 10 at 92.
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Ideally the parties having to arbitrate tlieir dispute are deemed to ha\ e agreed and aic under an
obligation to produce all rele\ ant documents, submit themseh es to examination by the tribunal ;md carry
out all directions of the tribunal required for tlic proper and efficient conduct of tJie arbitration proceedings.
Ideal conditions do not howev er. stay fore\ er. Once tJie disputes anse the parties arc seldom able to agree
on an\ilung Wliere the parties to llie agreement refuse to produce tlie documents in tlicir possession or
submit themselves to e.xamination by the tribunal assistance of tlic courts of tlie place of arbitration is
una\oidable. Tliis is more so as tlie arbitration tribunal does not has any power to hold tlie recalcitrant part>
in contempt. All it can do is draw an ad\ erse inference against such part) in tlie award. Assistance of the
courts is imperative where tlie documents are in possession of tlurd part} or tlurd parr\ testimony is
required as the tribunal, w hich deri\ es its autliorit> from llie consent of llie parties, does not lia\ e any
power over tliese tliird parties. See Infra notes 100, 101 and 102.
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the claim if the plaintiff has no access to any material or documents other than those in
his own possession
c) Supervisory Role
Though the courts generally exercise supervisory control over arbitration after the
award has been made, most of the developed legal systems permit the courts to intervene
in and supervise and control the proceedings. Even in countries like France, which has a
non-interventionist legal tradition, it is possible to apply to the courts for emergency
relief in presence of a strong evidence of the arbitrator having been bribed by the other
party. On the other hand legal systems of some countries, England for instance, provides
for court intervention not only with regard to jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal but also
at other stages during the course of the proceedings For instance, in England the courts
are empowered to remove an arbitrator if they are of the opinion that he has
"misconducted himself or the proceedings." The proceedings are considered to have been
misconducted when they are conducted in a manner manifestly unfair to one of the
parties."^
B. After The Award Has Been Rendered
Almost all legal systems of the world exercise some degree of control and
supervision over the arbitration award made in proceedings conducted on their territories.
115
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Sigvard Janin, Supra note 106 at 92.
See Infra Cliapler III, Country Practices
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The extent of this control is however, debatable ' though there is a general consensus
that the countries should insist and ensure the observance of minimum standards of
fairness and justice in the arbitration proceedings held u/ithin their jurisdictions. This
supervision is exercised by providing for challenge or review of arbitral awards Judicial
supervision over arbitral awards by providing for challenge or review of awards may be
exercised by any of the following means:
T Refiisal of recognition or enforcement of awards; or
2. Setting aside the awards for excess authority or lack of due process."^
An award is challenged on the hope that it would be set aside or modified or
varied in a manner beneficial to the party making such a challenge. If set aside the award
is deprived of its legal validity and thereby becomes unenforceable not only in the
country where it has been so set aside but also internationally, by virtue of the New York
Convention. '^° If the award is not set aside but varied, its legal position depends on the
manner in which this variation is etYected. In case the award is remitted back to the
tribunal with directions to vary it, the new varied award takes the place of the old award.
It is furtlier debatable w hetlier a distinction should be made between domestic and international
arbitrations witli tJie degree of control on tlie former being more tlian that on tJie latter.
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See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 429.
Historically the grounds of re\ iew w ere wide and \ aried and ranged from error of fact or law on the face
of the award in England to an arbitrator's demand for e.\ccssi\e fee in Switzerland. The modem tendency',
however, is tJie con\crgence of different national s> stems of lav\. An attempt m tlus direction is made by
various international conxentions like tlie New York Con\cntion. It is. ho\\e\ er. imporiimt to note Uiat
these international con\ entions deal with tlie recogniuon and enforcement and not cliallenges to arbitration
awards. Tliey, New York Convention for instance, provide for limited and e.xliaustive grounds for challenge
to arbitral aw ards. Tliere are. how e\er. no international com entions go\ eming tlie extent of control and
superMsion a state may exercise o\er arbitration proceedings. The control and supcrv ision w hich may be
exercised may tlierefore van, from one state to anotlier.
"'^ Article V( 1 )(e) of tJie New York Com ention Supra note 4 1 ; tJie European con\ ention is cm exception to
tliis general rule as tlie European Convention does not require refusal of recognition on tlie ground Uiat tlie
award has been set aside or vacated in tlie countr> of its origin See Supra note 72.
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If, however, the court itself passes a judgment varying the award this judgment takes the
place of the award.
Challenge, which is a positive attack on the validity of the award, may take
different forms depending on the relevant provisions of the system of law under which it
is made. It may take the form of an appeal whereby a request is made to the court to
vacate or vary the award on a point of law It may take the form of an application seeking
the award to be varied or remitted back to the arbitral tribunal for revision. The revision
may be claimed on the grounds that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or that the
subject matter of the dispute was not capable of being settled by arbitration or that there
was a violation of the principles of fair hearing.
This challenge to the legality and validity of an arbitral award is to be addressed
to the court of competent jurisdiction, which is the national court of the place or the situs
of arbitration.'^' The grounds available, for challenging the validity of the award, depend
on the legal system of this place arbitration Though more theoretical than real, there is an
exception to this general rule that an arbitration award may be challenged in the national
'' Tliough the pam against whom the award is souglu to be enforced ma\ wait for the holder of the award
to bring an action for its enforcement. He can tlien resist Uiis enforcement on an\ of the grounds mentioned
in Uie New York Convention, Uiereby challenging its \ aliditv Tliis procedure suffers from an inlierent
shortcoming in tlie sense tliat it cedes tJie control of forum selection to tlie ad\erse party, a fact tliat may
present an unattracti\e posture in subsequent enforcement proceedings. It is furilicr important to note that
tliere is nothing in llie New York Con\ ention tJiat pre\ enis an award holder or creditor from seeking
simultaneous enforcement in several different forums though Llie probability of success \ar> from one
forum to another and Uie decisions of national courts of one forum ha\e preclusive effect on proceedings in
other jurisdictions.
If the award-debtor does not want to wait for Uie award-creditor to commence enforcement proceedings and
wants to cliallenge tlie award, he lias to bnng acuon in llie national courts of the state llie award lias been
rendered. Wlien an action challenging tlie award is brought in tlie junsdiclion where tlie award is made the
grounds of challenge are not limited by the New York Conxention Tlie award iiia> be grounded on an\
basis contained under tlie national law of llie forum state. Wliereas defense to an action for confinnalion of
Uie award is limited by the provisions of Art. V of Uie New York Con\ ention See Gencralh GARY B.
BORN. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES. 628 - 631.
641 (1994); See Generally VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 264 - 382
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courts and under the national law of the place where it is rendered. An arbitration award
may also be challenged under the law of the country, whose procedural law governs the
procedure followed by the arbitral tribunal " Germany among others is one of the few
countries which provides for an award to be set aside if it has been made in proceedings
held outside Germany but governed by the German procedural law. ""
'"' Tlie concept of part\' autonomy in arbitration gives freedom to the parties to subject tlie arbitration to the
procedural law of the country other tJian the one where the arbitration is actuiilly held. (Tins pnnciple
ho\ve\ er. is subject to an o\emding prmciple tliat tlicse procedural rules must comply w ith the mandatory
requirements of the law and public policy if the situs.) Tliis is also recognized by the provisions of article
V(l)(e) of the New York Con\ention wluch pro\ides tJiat an award may be refused recognition and
enforcement on tlie basis tliat it has been set aside or suspended b> the competent authont} of the counuy
in which, or under the law of which it is made
.:
For instance tlie parties may agree to arbitrate tlieir disputes in countn A but go\ erned b\ the law
of countn. B. For tlie New York Con\ention to appl> the award must be considered to be non-domestic"
under tlie law of A. Tliis means whellier or not tlie award is held to be "non-doniestic" depends on the
discretion of Uie national courts of A or B. Tlie existence of tlus discretion makes Uie holding of arbitration
in country A but subjecting it to tlie law of countn,' B a risk-y proposition. Tlie following illustration
liighlights Uie problems that may arise in such a case.
Where tlie arbitration is held in A but is subject to the procedural law s of B tw o considerations
need to be taken into account.
1
.
Whether tlie courts of A w ould allow the proceedings to be held in its lcmtor> but subject to
tlie law of B; and
2. WheUier tlie courts of B would recognize tlie possibilit\ of arbitration in anotlier state but
under Uieir law
In case tlie courts of A do not recognize arbitration in Uieir territorN but under tlie law of B. tliey
w ill treat tlie award as a domestic award and hold lliemselves competent to entertain a setting aside action.
In case courts of B recognize tlie possibility of arbitration in anotlier state but go\ erned by their law, tliey
will also consider the award to be a domestic award and claim competence to entertain the setting aside
action.
Where tlie courts of A recognize tlie arbitration in tlieir temton. but go\ erned by the law of B,
tliey will consider Uie award to be a foreign award and Uierefore decline jurisdiction to entertain a setUng
aside acUon. If Uie courts of B do not recognize Uie possibility of arbitration in another state governed by
Uieir law
,
Uiey will treat Uie award to be a foreign award and claim Uiat Uiey are not competent to entertain
any action for setting aside Uie award. See VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 19 - 27
'-^ See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 432; The law of Federal Republic of Germany is probably
Uie only law Uiat deals with Uiis second possibility. Section 2 of Uiis law provides:
"(1) If an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made in another Contracting Stale under
Uie Gennan procedural law. Uien Uie request for setting aside of tins award can be made in Uie F.R.
Germany. Tlie SetUng aside is governed by Sections 1041. 1043. 1045(1) and 1046 of Uie Code of Civil
Procedure
(2) If Uie request for enforcement of an award wiUiin Uie meaning of paragraph I is refused by
virtue of Article V of the Con\enUon. Uien Uie award shall be set aside at Uic same Ume in case one of Uie
grounds set forUi in section 1041 of Uie Code of Civil Procedure is present.": See FOUCHARD in his
comment on Uie court's opinion in Journal du Droit Inlernallonal {19S0) 669 at 673.
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C. Country Practices
1. France'^"^
The French law, even the decree of May 12, 1981, does not makes any mention of
circumstances in which the courts may order attachments or other interim remedies,
injunctions for instance, in support of arbitration. However, it is a generally accepted
principle of the French law that, notwithstanding the existence of the arbitration clause,
judges sitting 'en refere' (in chambers), in certain circumstances, possess jurisdiction to
order conservatory measures, attachments or interlocutory payments as long as they do
not prejudice the merits of the dispute under arbitration. According to .Article 1458 of the
French Civil Procedure Code, a State court will decline jurisdiction to hear a dispute
which has been submitted to arbitration by virtue of an agreement to arbitrate It is
however, important to note that this obligation is imposed only on the courts deciding the
dispute on merits and not on courts sitting 'en refere' and ordering provisional remedies.
The jurisdiction of the \]uge des referes' to order interim measures, not affecting the
merits of the dispute, is undisputed " In presence of an emergent situation the presence
of an arbitration clause does not prevent a judge 'en refere^ from exercising his
jurisdiction and awarding interim relief and this relief can be ordered at any stage of the
arbitration proceedings.
In international arbitration, under the Code of Civil Procedure, the 'juge des
refere' has the jurisdiction where a French national is either plaintiff (article 14) or the
defendant (article 15). The French courts have jurisdiction to order interim remedies
Maitre Jacques Buliart. Attachment And OlJier Intcnm Court Remedies In Support Of Arbitration, 12
Int'l Bus. Law. 107
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when the parties are non-nationals if the remedies involve real estate located in France or
a plane which has landed on the French territory. In addition to the parties being non-
nationals the \liig(^ (Jt\s re/ere^ has, by exception the jurisdiction to order interim relief
even in cases where the proceedings are not governed by the French law and France is
also not the situs of arbitration when the measures are purely conservatory', do not affect
the merits of the case, are aimed at the preservation of goods and monies and are in the
interest of general public peace and justice.
It is important to note that though the ^juge des referes' has broad powers to grant interim
relief, he may, under Article 92 of the Code, declare himself incompetent, to grant any
such relief, on his own initiative. French courts are never competent to grant interim
relief, even if a French national is involved, if the real estate is located outside France.
As to the interim measures, all measures that can be ordered by a president sitting
'en refere' in cases that do not involve an arbitration provision are also available in cases
involving an arbitration clause. The presence of an arbitration clause does not place any
restrictions on the powers of the president once the tests of urgency, serious challenge
and existence of a dispute are satisfied Article 808 empowers the president to order
interim measures ranging from appointment of an expert to determine the status of goods
to the appointment of temporary receivers. The courts are flirther competent to order an
interim ordinance, ex parte, for the preservation of evidence. Further under article 809 of
the Code of Civil Procedure the judge sitting V/? refere' may award interlocutory
'^- Cassation, June 21 1904. Dalloz 1906, p 395: July 3 1951. Dalloz 1951. p 701.
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payment to the claimant if there is no serious challenge to the existence of the
obligation
''^^'
Further conservatory or reparatory measures required to prevent imminent damage or to
put a halt to a patently unlawful disturbance may also be prescribed by the president
sitting 'en refere' under the provisions of article 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
These measures may even be ordered in cases where there is a serious dispute Among
the most famous conservatory measures ordered are the attachments.
2. Italy'^^
An important feature of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure " is that it does not
give the arbitrator any authority to order attachments or other forms of interim relief
(article 18) and the existence of an arbitration agreement deprives the courts of any
jurisdiction over the dispute. This however, does not mean that the parties cannot
approach the courts for interim relief The Code of Civil Procedure provides for the
following types of interim relief;
A. Attachments
B. Inspection or technical survey
C. Interim Injunctions
^" For such an award to be made Uiere must be a review on merits. The Court of Appeals of Paris lias ruled
tliat a 'juge des referes' is not competent to grant interlocutor)- pa> nient m cases contammg an arbitration
provision. Tlie court was of the opinion tliat the finding as to a serious challenge to tlie existence of the
obligation necessanly in\ oKes a ruling on merits w luch tlie parties to tlie dispute excluded from the
jurisdiction of the court.(July 3 1979. JCP 1980 11. 19389). Six days later. tJie Court de Cassation however
ruled tliat tlie presence of an arbitration clause does not deprive tJie judge sitting 'en refere who has in any
case established the urgenc>. competence to grant pavment to a claimant of an obligation not seriously
disputed.(Cassation July 9 1979).
'"^ Giavanm M. Ughi. Attaclunents And Otlier Remedies In Support Of Arbitration. 12 Int'l Bus. Law. 1 15.
'-^M at 115
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The Code of Civil Procedure provides for two types of attachments;
a) Conservatory Attachments'^'' (sequestro conservatory)
b) Attachments for Interim Custody of Goods' * (sequestro giudiziario)
A creditor who has reasonable fear to loose the guarantee that the debtor would
honor his obligations may make an application to the court for the grant of a conservatory
attachment The order of conservatory attachment may be granted either ex parte or after
hearing the opposing party. Further this remedy may be granted before the
commencement or during the arbitration proceedings and the court may make the grant of
injunction subject to the posting of a bond by the plaintiff or applicant This order of
conservatory attachment can be enforced, within thirty days of its granting, on any and all
assets and properties, moveable and immovable, of the defendant up to the value
permitted by the court. For this order of conservatory attachment against a foreigner, it is
necessary that the alien debtor has assets or properties in Italy, for the jurisdiction to
exist.
Once the attachment has been granted, the plaintiff creditor must, within fifteen
days of the date of order, commence proceedings before the same court for the
confirmation of the attachment order. The court must, in its judgement deciding the
confirmation of the attachment, also establish the term after which the attachment would
cease to be effective if the arbitration award deciding the merits of the dispute is not
recognized and made enforceable in Italy (Article 680) In case the plaintiff fails to
commence the confirmation proceedings within the prescribed period the attachment
Tlie main purpose of the conser\aton, attachment is to secure tlie amount in dispute. It achieves this by
imposing restnctions on tlie transfer or disposal of assets by tlie defendant for an equivalent amount.
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order is denied any effect However, if the court declines to confirm the attachment order,
a fmal judgement is required for this attachment order to become ineffective As the
Itahan procedural system provides for three instances ofjurisdiction, once the attachment
order is granted it is very time consuming to get that vacated or revoked.
Same procedural rules, as enumerated above, are applicable to an attachment
order for interim custody of goods. It is however important to note that whenever an
attachment application relates to real estate, attachment order can be made only after
hearing the other party and not ex parte.
The application for inspection and technical survey is to be made to the president
of the court which has the jurisdiction to decide the dispute on merits. Though this order
is normally granted after hearing the opposing party, it may however in exceptional
circumstances be granted ex parte Where the evidence gathered is to be used in
subsequent proceedings, article 683 provides that such evidence can be disputed during
the subsequent proceedings as regards its admissibility and may also be disregarded.
For the grant of interim injunctions, whose purpose and effect is anticipating the
effect on the fijture decision on the merits of the dispute rather than being a protective
measure safeguarding enforcement of fiiture judgement, the plaintiff must offer prima
facie evidence of
(i) the 'fiimus boni juris' '"'^ and
" Tlie purpose is to lia\ e the goods entrusted to a recei\ er until the dispute betw een tJie parties is decided
by the courts or tlie arbitrators.
Article 683 refers to proceedings before tlie courts, however in absence of an> specific provision the
same is also deemed to be applicable to arbitration proceedings.
" A Latin expression meaning tlie existence of a riglit ordained by law
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(ii) the existence of an irreparable damage during the time necessary to obtain
a judgement or award on merits.
In case an attachment order or an injunction has been wrongly obtained in an ex
parte hearing, the Code of Civil Procedure provides certain remedies:
a. The aggrieved party may request that the plaintiff be ordered to post a bond in
respect of possible damages and costs. This order may be made at the time
when the injunction is granted or thereafter.
b. Where it is established that the order was made for the protection of rights
which did not exist, article 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the
arbitrators to dismiss the claim of the plaintiff
Finally, the debtor may also apply for the withdrawal of the attachment order by
offering guarantee for an amount equivalent to the value of the creditor's claim, taking
into account the value of the assets or property seized. The affected third parties may
either apply for an injunctive relief or file opposition to the proceedings. Third parties
are, in any event, entitled to damages (Article 96). Though the Italian Code of Civil
Procedure provides for attachments, orders of inspection of technical survey and interim
injunctions it does not make any provision for the security of costs even in cases where a
plaintiff resides outside the jurisdiction of the Italian Courts.
3. England'"
The Arbitration Acts of 1950''''' and 1979' '"^ and the English common law gives
the English courts a variety of powers to support arbitration in event of evasion, delaying
'^' David Shenton. Attaclunents And Oilier Interim Remedies In Support Of Arbitration. 12 Int'l Bus. Law
101(1984).
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tactics and non-cooperation by any of the parties during the interlocutory stages of
arbitration These powers possessed by the courts and the remedies they can provide can
be studied under the following heads:
a) Restriction on the transfer and disposal of assets by a respondent.
For ordering restrictions on the transfer and disposal of assets by the respondent,
the English courts assume or exercise jurisdiction if the party is capable of being served
with the original process within their jurisdiction i.e. within the geographic territories of
England and Wales Where the defendant is beyond these territorial confines, leave of the
court is required for service of process The grant of such a leave lies in the discretion of
the court and is subject to the overriding principle that it must be convenient and just for
the court to give such leave Further, it is necessary to show that the case falls in such a
category where the court exercises 'excessive jurisdiction' over the defendant who is
beyond its territorial confines and where the arbitration clause provides that the
arbitration is to take place within the jurisdiction of the English court. It is flirther
possible for the courts to exercise jurisdiction even where the parties are foreigners and
the proceedings are to be held beyond the jurisdiction of the court but are subject to the
English curial law. In addition to this courts may also take jurisdiction even where neither
the respondent to the application nor the subject matter is situated within its jurisdiction if
'^'' The Arbitration Act 1950. 6 C. 27.
'^-^ The Arbitration Act 1979, No. 750 (C.16).
Tlie circumstances in wluch the court exercises its e.xcessne jurisdiction are contained in tlie provisions
of the Rules of the Supreme Court Order 1 1
.
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English curial law governs the proceedings. In these situations the court takes its powers
from the provisions of sections 12(6)(g) and (h) of the Arbitration Act of 1950
In appropriate circumstances the English courts may also order pre-trial
attachment of assets, also known as 'Mareva Injunctions' These injunctions do not attach
to the property itself but act in personam upon the defendant enjoining him from
disposing of or transferring assets generally or specified assets pending flirther orders by
the court. It is however important to note that the courts generally grant Mareva
Injunctions only where the assets are within its jurisdiction and are not prepared to grant
the injunction where though the defendant is within the jurisdiction but not the assets.
Mareva injunctions may, however, be granted in cases where the arbitral situs is outside
the territorial jurisdiction of England but the proceedings are governed by the English
procedural law if the assets are within the jurisdiction of the court. The procedure
contemplated is an ex parte application followed by an inter-parties hearing where the
defendant can come back, within a short date, to seek justice if the injunction has been
wrongly granted.
Disobedience of the restraining order results in contempt proceedings which may
result in heavy sanctions and even imprisonment. As these injunctions also apply against
third parties therefore third parties who have been given notice of the order can also be
punished.
,
b) Security for costs
Where the plaintiff is ordinarily resident outside the jurisdiction of the court, the
defendant may apply to the court for an order directing the plaintiff to give sufficient
Section 12(6)(g) and (h) provide tliat for the purpose of arbitration proceedings tlie High Court lias Uie
same powers to order interim measures as if tlie matter is being tned before it.
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security, within the jurisdiction of the court, to pay defendant's cost in case the action
against him is unsuccessful and an order of costs is made against the piaintitT The order
for giving security for costs lies in the discretion of the court It is important to note that
in the absence of an express power the arbitrator cannot make such an order himself In
case of international arbitrations the High Court is of the view that the discretion of the
court is to be exercised against the grant of the order if the parties have chosen England
as venue purely for reasons of convenience and have expressly agreed in their agreement
that this kind of procedural remedy will not be sought.
c) Procedural remedies relating to discovery, inspection etc.
The power of the court to grant procedural remedies in aid of arbitration are
contained in section 12 of the Arbitration Act of 1950 Under these powers the court can
order and ensure attendance of witnesses in arbitration proceedings by issuing a
subpoena It has the power to make orders relating to discovery of documents and
examination of witnesses on commission or by letters rogatory Further the court may
make orders for inspection of property or other things forming the subject matter of
arbitration and can authorize taking of samples. It is important to note that the proviso to
section 12 of the 1950 Act provides that the court does not usurp the arbitrator's powers
to make such directions and the power of the court in this respect is only to be used as a
means of last resort for enforcing the orders made by the arbitrators in this regard.
Section 5 of the Arbitration Act of 1979 provides that on an application of the arbitrator
in connection with a default made by the party, the court may pass an order empowering
the arbitrator to continue with the proceeding in default of appearance or any other act by
one of the parties.
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D. Public Policy (Arbitrability)
The limitations imposed by public policy of the arbitral situs on the use of
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution are encompassed in and denoted by the
expression 'arbitrability'. Each country, having regard to its social and economic policies,
decides as to which disputes are capable of being resolved by arbitration and which are
reserved for the courts to decide. In an international scenario this involves balancing
competing policy considerations Each countr\- attempts to balance the competing
considerations of reserving matters of public importance to the courts against the interest
of encouraging commercial arbitration for resolution of commercial disputes, which at
times is spurred by the need to reduce the burden of overloaded courts, the need for
promoting international trade and maintaining respect for international comity Other
reasons may include the desire to enhance the attractiveness of the countr>' as a forum for
international arbitration
It is important to note that in case the matter covered by the agreement to arbitrate
is not capable of being resolved by arbitration under the law of the arbitration agreement
or the law of the place of arbitration, the agreement is unenforceable Moreover, even if
the arbitration is proceeded with the resulting award may be denied recognition and
enforcement if the dispute is not arbitrable under the law or such recognition and
enforcement is contrary to the public policy of the country where enforcement is
sought.
'^' See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 137
'^^ See VAN DEN BERG. Supra note 14 at 359 to 382; See Anicie V(2) of the New York Con\entJon
Supra note 4
1
52
Limitations imposed by public policy of the arbitral situs do not necessarily mean
that the arbitral tribunal must reflise to hear an issue which infringes upon the forbidden
field. The only requirement is that the tribunal accepts the law on the issue in question as
that law has been determined by its national courts For instance, if a party to the
arbitration claims a license or patent, the tribunal must accept such license or patent on its
face value without indulging in the determination of the regulatory agency which granted
it.'"*" At the same time the parties are also obligated to not to avoid or circumvent the
mandatory laws by resorting to the choice of forum and law provisions in the arbitration
agreement, if those laws would otherwise apply to the performance of the contract by the
141
parties.
Cases involving the provisions of antitrust and competition laws, which most
countries enact with the sole aim of safeguarding and encouraging competition, provide a
good illustration of the concept of arbitrability. These laws, antitrust and competition, are
administered by state agencies which monitor activities and invariably possess penal
powers that form the basis of the penalties imposed by the courts Apart from these the
courts also possess jurisdiction to consider civil consequences of breach of these laws and
may, as in the United States, award multiple ( treble) damages for violations. '"^"^
Determining violations of competition and antitrust laws being the exclusive
domain of administrative agencies, only these agencies are competent to grant
'^° See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 137. 138.
"" Id.
^^^ScQ Id. at 139.
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exemptions from mandatory compliance with the provisions of these laws.
Nevertheless the courts are free to rule on these violations in a civil suit
The question that however, remains to be answered is; Are arbitral tribunals
competent to rule on the violations of antitrust and competition laws and award damages,
multiple or otherwise'^
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court, reversing the prior trend, held that as
long as the arbitrators correctly apply the mandatory provisions of the antitrust laws,
disputes involving the application of these laws are arbitrable. The arbitrability of
antitrust disputes was however made subject to two caveats. The court reserved the right
to review the award, at the time of recognition and enforcement, to ensure compliance
with the provisions of the antitrust laws. Secondly, where the choice of law and forum
clauses were intended to deprive a party of the right to pursue remedies under the US
antitrust laws, the agreement containing such a choice is to be condemned The two
'"''*
Practices restricting or distorting competition arc proliibited by the pro\ isions of Article 85 of Uie Rome
Treaty-. Article 85(2) of the treaty declares such agreement s to be void unless exempted under Article
85(3). Such an exemption can be granted by the European Commission alone. Though the arbitrator is
competent to rule tliat an agreement is exempted or an application is pending but he cannot make a
recommendation to tJie Commission tliiit an agreement qualifies for an exemption. The onl> options left
with tlie arbilTdtor. on finding a \ lolation, is to either declare tJie agreement to be null and \ oid or pennit
one of the parties to seek an exemption from the Cominission.
To avoid circumvention or non-application of the EC competition law by arbitration awards, regulation
17/62 of the European Commission requires all parties to an exemption to notifv the Coaunission of all
arbitral awards relating to Uie agreement tliat has been so exempted. In case tlie award lias llie effect of
extending the exemption beyond tiie permissible linut the Commission may withdraw tlie exemption. Tlus
is a public policy measure to protect against abuse of exemptions. Sec Id. at 141
'"^ ScsMitubishi Motors Corporalion v. Soler Clvysler-Plymoulh Inc. 473 U.S. 614(1985). In tlus case tlie
court pernutted tlie arbitration to proceed despite the uuohement of Americcm antitrust laws. Gi\ing
special importance to Uie international nature of the dispute the court observed: "... we conclude tliat
concerns of iniematiomil comity, respect for the capacities of foreign ;md tnmsnational tribunals, tlie
sensitivity to the need of the international system for predictabilit> in the resolution of disputes require that
we enforce the parties" agreement. e\ en assuming tliat a contrar> result would be fortlicoming in a domestic
context."
Tlie court further observed that llicre was no e\idencc tliat the Japanese arbitrators were not capable of or
would not correctly apply the Amencan antitrust laws. Moreover tlie court obser\ ed lluit it can rc\ lew Uie
award at Uie enforcement stage for ensuring compliance w iUi Uie American antitrust laws and public policy
and refuse recognition and enforcement if Uicre are an>' violations. Tlie court remarked: There is no reason
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caveats present a dilemma for the arbitrators who are not only expected to give effect to
the parties choice of law and forum but also ensure compliance with mandatory
provisions of the US antitrust laws if the award is to be enforced in the Unhed States.
This is fijrther supported by the argument that permitting the parties to exercise choice of
forum and law so as to avoid compliance with the mandator>' provisions of law of a
country would be contrary to the public policy of most of the countries '"*" For instance,
in Germany certain restrictive trade practice disputes are arbitrable The tribunal
examines the transaction for compliance with the German competition law but the
to assume at Uie outset of tlic dispute tliat international tribunal will not pro\ide an adequate meclianism.
To be sure, tlie international JU'biiral tribunal owes no prior iiilegiance to Uie legal norms of particular slates;
hence it has direct obligation to vindicate their statutory norms of piuticuhir states; hence it has no direct
obligation to vindicate their statuton dictates. The tribunal, however, is bound to effectuate the intentions
of the parties. Wlicre the parties ha\e agreed that the arbitral bod\ is to decide a defined set of claims wluch
includes, as in these cases, those arising from the application of the American antitrust law. tlie tribunal
tlicrcfore should be bound to decide tliat dispute in accord w itli tlie nationd law giving rise to tlie claim.
And so long as ilie prospective litigant effectively may \indicate its cause of action in Uie arbitral forum,
the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.
Ha\ing penmtted tlie arbiuntion to go forward, tlie national courts of the United States will have
tlie opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure tliat tlie legitimate interest in tlie enforcement of
antitrust laws lias been addressed. The Con\ention reser\es to each sigruiton countr> the nglit to refuse
enforcement of tlie award w here tlie "recognition or enforcement" of the award would be contrary to tlie
public policy of tliat country."
Tlie court furllier remarked: ".. The contro\ ersies tliat international arbitral institutions are called upon to
resolve have increased in diversity and complexity Yet die potential of these tribunals for efficient
disposition of legal disagreements ansing from commercial relations lias not yet been tested. If tliey are to
take a central place in tlie international legal order, national courts will need to "sluike off the old judicial
hostility to iirbitration" Kulukundis shipping Co. v. Aiuiorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 97S(CA2 1942) and
also tlieir customary and understandiible unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim arising mider
domestic law to a foreign arbitral tribunal To lliis e.xtent. at least, it will be necessary for tlie national
courts to subordinate domestic notions of iirbitrability to the international policy favoring commercial
arbitration"
In deciding tlus case tlie Supreme Court rejected tlie decision in Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427(195SjwheTein
it was held tliat claims under securities legislation were not arbitrable and .American Safety Equipment
Corp. V. J.P. Maguire & Co. 391 F. 2d 821 (2d Circ. C.A.. 1968) which following Uie Wilko precedent held
anuinist disputes to be not arbitrable.
'- REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 140.
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proceedings should not deprive the parties of their right to refer the matter for the opinion
of the court
'""^
The approaches which ditYerent legal systems take towards the issue of
arbitrability of disputes can be categorized as liberal and restrictive
Most legal systems of the world permit the parties to arbitrate disputes involving
rights over which they have complete control If under the relevant law the parties are
free to reach an agreement or a settlement, they are also deemed to be free to arbitrate the
dispute '"^'^ In F.R.G. "[a]n arbitration agreement is legally binding when the litigation in
question can be freely handled by the parties and when the parties can terminate it by a
compromise/'''^ The 1989 Swiss law takes a very liberal approach towards arbitration.
The new law makes international disputes pertaining to patent and trademark issues and
antitrust matters arbitrable.''^ In United States the courts maintain a distinction between
domestic and international disputes and have held that disputes pertaining to violations of
securities laws, which are considered to be non-arbitrable in a domestic scenario at that
point in time, could proceed to arbitration under the ICC rules by virtue of a truly
international agreement.'"' Subsequent to this ruling the courts in the United States have
''^ The Gennan law of restrictive trade practices 1974 in § 9 para 1 provides tliat an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes in connection wiUi restrictive trade practices is null and \ oid unless tlie parties are given a
resort to litigation. See Kulin. Arbitrabilitv of Antitrust Disputes in tlie FRG. 3 Arbitration International.
226(1987).
"^ REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 142.
'^^ See Arbitration in Eiu-ope (1981) ICC Publication No. 353 at 85; Also see § 1025(1) of tlie Gennan
Code of Civil Procedure
''^" Sec Swiss Pri\ate International Act. Chapter 12. Article 177; M. Blessing. The New International
Arbitration Law in Switzerland, 5 Journal of IniemaiioiKil Arbitration, 9.25.
'-' Fritz Sherk v. Alberto Culver Co. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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mles that such dispute are arbitrable both in international agreements and domestic
cases.
'"^^ The liberal trend towards arbitration in the United States is further illustrated by
the decisions holding disputes under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) and violations of Robertson-Patman Price Discrimination Act to be
arbitrable.'"
Countries which have generally adopted a favorable attitude towards arbitration
may at times take a restrictive approach For instance the District Court for the District of
Columbia has held that nationalization is a state act and therefore an arbitral tribunal does
not possess jurisdiction to decide upon the validity of the nationalization law ' * It is
important to note that this decision of the District Court of Columbia was subsequently
vacated by the Court of Appeals on motion of AAA as amicus curiae and the parties
having reached an agreement in the meantime.
Scope of the concept of arbitrability is further limited by international public
policy. The limiting effect of international public policy principally comes into play in
cases involving bribery or other forms of inducement. Notwithstanding the efforts of
national laws and national and international agencies, these inducement often play an
important role in clinching international contracts What should be the attitude of the
'" See Shearson/Amencan Express. Inc. v. McMohon 482 U.S. 220(1987),- Rodriguez de Ouijas v.
Shearson American Express, Inc. 104 L.Ed. 2d 526(1989).
'" See Shearson American Express. Inc. v. McMahon 482 U.S. 220(1987); Genesco. Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi
and Co. Lid 815 F.2d. 840(USCA 2d Cir.. 1987).
'-^ Liamco v. Libya 482 F.Supp. 1 175; VI Yearbook Commercial Arbitration. 248.
Liamco v. Libya. United States Court of Appeals. Distnct of Colmnbia. May 6. 1981. Misc. no. 79 -
155
0057, no. 80 - 1207; VII Yearbook Commercial Arbitration. 382.
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arbitral tribunal towards these issues therefore is of foremost importance One arbitrator
held such disputes to be not arbitrable.'^*' He remarked that
" [...] it cannot be contested that there exists a general principal of law
recognized by civilized nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores or
international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they cannot be
sanctioned by courts or arbitrators This principle is especially apt for use before
international arbitration tribunals that lack a 'law of the forum' in the ordinary sense of
the term.
Subsequently in another ICC arbhration which dealt with an agent claiming
commission under the contract, it was held by the sole arbitrator that though he had the
necessary jurisdiction the matter was not arbitrable as the contract was illegal.
It is settled law that contracts in violation of international public policy are void.
It is, however, difficult to ascertain as to what acts can be said to have violated this
international public policy, though there is some kind of consensus that agreements
aiding piracy, terrorism, racial discrimination etc are contrary to public policy and no
derogation should be permitted in any manner whatsoever. "^ The position of bribery is
somewhat different. In a case involving the sale of fighter planes to Saudi Arabia, the
seller sought to set aside the arbitral award, for payment of commission to the agent, on
the grounds that the agent had promised to and did not pay any bribes to Saudi Arabian
officials. The court decided the matter on the basis of Saudi and American laws intended
^-^ See REDFERN & HUNTER .S^ra note 9 at 145.
'^' LEW. APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION , 554 (1978).
See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 145; Kosheri and Leboulanger. L'abitrage face "a la
corruption et au.\ trafics d" influence. (1984) Rev. Arb. 3; Also See Goldman. The Complementiuv Role of
Judges And Arbitrtors in Ensuring That International Conunercial Arbitration is Efiecti\e. 60 Years of ICC
Arbitration - A Look at Uie Future. ICC Publication No. 412. at 225. 272; It has been suggested by some
authors tliat in practice tJus the only course to be followed because it is tlie onI\ course of heanng the
dispute tliat may detennine tlie existence of corruption or other form of illegal inducement or gratification.
'^^ See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 146.
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to curb corruption refused to recognize the claims made by the agent It however, upheld
the payment of commission to the agent prior to the enactment of these anti-corruption
laws with no reference being made to international public policy ''' in England use of
influence to gain a contract or bargain is contrary to public policy and in international
cases the English courts do not enforce a contract for payment for using influence to
secure an agreement if prohibited by the place of performance.'^'
'^" See Northrop Corp. v. Triad 593 F.Supp. 928 (1984).
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See Lemenda Trading Co. Ltd. v. African Middle East Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1988] Q.B. 448.
CHAPTER IV
The Applicable Law
Introduction
Most business disputes turn on facts and are decided witii no more than a passing
reference to law. An arbitral tribunal is often entrusted with the task of resolving issue of
fact without any reference to any specific system of laws. '^' This, however, does not
mean that international commercial arbitration exists in a legal vacuum. An agreement to
arbitrate disputes, apart from being regulated by the wishes of the parties is also regulated
by the governing law. This governing law is known as ^lex arbitri'^^^ and is invariably
the law of the place of arbitration, the 'lex fori" '^"^ and is therefore also known as the 'lex
loci arbitri' . Other laws which regulate matters pertaining to capacity of the parties to
'^- See Generally REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 70.
It is important to understand that the lex arbitri is not necessarily the law governing the substantive
dispute nor is it the procedural law applied by the arbitrators. It the law that governs the validity of the
arbitral process itself. See William Park & Jan Paulsson, The Binding Force of International Arbitral
Awards, 23 Virginia Journal Of International Law 253, 254; Aiam Hirsch. The Place of Arbitration and
Lex Arbitn, 1986 Int'l Bus. L. J. 109 at 43.
Lex arbitri is also at times referred to as the 'curial law"; See GARY B. BORN Supra note 121 at 162;
since the arbitration must be conducted somewhere the parties cannot completely exclude themselves from
the application of the municipal law of this place or venue which includes mandatory norms and may
authorize supplemental procedures in addition to the ones expressly agreed upon by the parties. It is
important to note that these mandatory norms limit the concept of party autonomy. See Donald Francis
Donovan, International Commercial Arbitration and Public Policy. 27 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 645, 647 -
648 (1995); Some authors are of the view that the parties can choose the law governing the arbitration only
indirectly by the choice of the arbitral situs. See William W. Park & Jan Paulsson Supra note 163 at 254.
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arbitrate, validity and legality of the reference to arbitration etc also have to be taken into
. 165
account.
A. Lex A rhi/n
Though international commercial arbitration gives importance to the principle of
party autonomy and the parties to the arbitration agreement are free to determine the law
they want the proceedings to be governed by, each country has its own national habits
and notions of governing arbitration proceedings which take place within its
jurisdictions '*''' These notions and beliefs are by no means uniform and countries with
developed systems arbitration laws are reluctant to adopt the simplified legal regime
envisaged by the numerous international conventions on arbitration, fearing that these
may leave difficult questions unaddressed Many aspects of the arbitral process being
regulated by the law of the place of arbitration, such law assumes an important position in
the international arbitral process. '^^ At the same time it is important to have regard to the
rules and practices of the place of arbitration which govern matters like discovery.
"^-^
see generally REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 71.72.
'*''' Thougli tlie pnnciple of party autononi> is recognized by the New York Convention and is generally
guaranteed by many national arbitration statutes, it is qualified by the mandator.' requirements of tlie
national law of the arbitral situs. See article V(l)(d) of the New York convention Supra note 41 and article
19(1) of the UNCITRAL model law.; Party autonomy, a general pnnciple of private international law
which should be respected by the arbitrators, is subject to tlie limitations imposed by equally importimt
general principles of law and public policy One such general pnnciple is tJie conflict of laws principle
according to which certain mandator\ rules must be applied in tlie tcmtor\ w here certain activities are
conducted or undertaken. Tliis principle intended to protect public interest is based on tlie idea of national
sovereignty and as public policy justifies imposing controls over contractual relationships, tlie application
of these controls should not be left to the discretion of the pxirties. See Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens;
Contemporary Developments on Compensiition for Tcmiination or Breach. LVIX Bnt. Y.B. Intl L. 49.
53(1988); ALBERT DICEY & JOHN H. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 792 (1980).
In arbitrations conducted in a particular couiitr\ . without an\ express agreement o\ cr tlie subject of
curial law. the law of the arbitral situs pro\ ides tlie curial law and therefore must be consulted to detenmne
the various issues it regulates. See GARY B. BORN Supra note 121 at 162.
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interim relief, evidence, cross examination of witnesses, so as to ascertain the extent of
judicial assistance to the arbitral process.
As the venue of international arbitration is generally selected for to its
neutrality,"'^ the law governing the arbitration may at times be different form the law
applicable to the substantive matters in dispute. For instance an arbitral tribunal with its
seat in England may apply French or Swiss law to the merits of the dispute but its
proceedings will be governed by the provisions of the English arbitration law.
Arbitration laws of one country do not coincide with the arbitration laws of another
country and the matters which one country regards as falling within the scope of lex
arbitri are not necessarily the same as those regarded by another country. Despite these
differences, lex arbitri or the curial law is likely to extend or deal with the following
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matters
"'** The venue of international arbitration is generally neither tlie residence or place of business of either of
Uie parties. "It is the most con\enient location for tlic arbitrators and tlie parties to sit. orgjmizc hearings,
consider docuinents, make site \isits. and hear tlie witnesses to be chosen" Hirsch Supra note 163 at 43.
'^' Tlie law of the place of arbitration and Uie law intended by the parties to go\ern die arbitration compete
for application as tlie lex arbiiri. Though it is luiusuxil for the parties to agree, in tlie agreement to arbitrate,
on tlie issue of curial law ncAertheless national laws of many countries permit tlie parties to select a cunal
law, including a foreign cunal law . One such example is the English common law See ALBERT DICEY
&. JOHN H. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 580 - 81 (12"' ed. 1993). It is important to note Uiat
even in nations pennitting tlie selection of a foreign curial law , such a selection does not render tlie law of
Uie situs irrelevant. See GARYB. BORN Supra note 121 at 46 - 47. 59 - 62. 164 - 168; LEW Supra note
157 at 52; Under article 2 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code. Italuui natiomils cannot exclude llie
competence of Italian courts, w liile under tlie Gennan law parties are pennitted to select tlie procedural law
of only those states whose national courts liave jurisdiction over Uie dispute under inteniaUonally
recognized principles. See Going. Tlie Substantive law and the Law of Arbitration procedure in
international commercial arbitration. 96. 105-1U7(C. Sclmnttoff ed. 1975), also see William W. Park & Jan
Paulsson Supra note 163 at 254
Peter S. Smedresmaa Conflict of Laws in IntemaUonal Commercial Arbitration, California Western
IntemaUonal Law Journal 7(1977) at 267-268.
GARY B. BORN Supra note 121 at 162; See Gabriel M. Wilner. Determining Uie Law Govermng
Performance in IntemaUonal Commerci;iI Arbitration: A ConiparaU\e Study. 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 646. 648
(1965): Hirsch Supra note 163 at 44-44; Kazuo Iwasaki, Selection of Situs: Critena and Pnorities, 2 Arb.
Int'l 57 at 61.
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Arbitrability of the dispute;
the validity of the arbitration agreement;
- jurisdiction of the arbitrators, their appointment, removal and replacement and
challenge to their authority;
time limits for making the award and the rules pertaining to interim relief,
discovery, evidence, cross examination of witnesses and other judicial
assistance to the arbitral process;
- form, validity and finality of the award including the right of recourse against
it under the national law of the place of arbitration
In addition to these, though less clearly, the curial law also governs matters
pertaining to the interpretation and enforcement of the parties' agreement to arbitrate and
the conflict of laws rules applicable to the dispute.
A mere look at the above list indicates an obvious possibility of conflict between
the lex arbitri and different systems of law which may be equally relevant. ' For instance
countries differ in their notions of the concept of arbitrability which primarily relates to
public policy limitations on arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. A dispute may
be arbitrable under the lex arbitri and the law governing the agreement to arbitrate but it
" Tliough it IS possible for tlie proceedings to be held at one place and Uie award being made at aiiotlier
place, for tlie purposes of the present discussion it is assumed tliat both tlie place of proceedings and where
tlie award is made are the same.
"^ See GARY B. BORN Supra note 121 at 162
Sec Xavlera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compawa Imenmcional de Seguros del Peru 11988] Lloyd's
Rep. 1 16, 1 19. In tliis case Lord Justice Kerr identified three potentially rele\ant systems of law as having a
bearing on international commercial arbitration;
Uie law goxermng tlie substanti\c contract
the law go\ ermng tlic agreement to arbitrate
tlie law go\ ermng ilie conduct of ju-bilration.
Tliough Lord Justice kerr confined lus anal\ sis to the aforementioned s\ stems of law , tlie system of law
govermng tlie recognition and enforcement of awards also plays a \er> important and significant role.
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may not be so arbitrable under the law of the place of recognition and enforcement In
such a situation the resulting award may be refijsed recognition and enforcement under
the New York Convention. " Apart from that effective conduct of arbitration
proceedings depends upon the extent of judicial assistance available under the law of the
place of arbitration In addition to this, the choice of place of arbitration may have
important unintended consequences for the parties if its law confers powers on the courts
and arbitrators powers not expected by or known to the parties, for instance consolidation
of arbitration proceedings
According to the 'seat theory' of /ex arbifri an arbitration is governed by the law
of the place of arbitration i.e. the seat of the arbitral tribunal, the 'locus arbitrC^^^ . This
theory has had significant effect on the language adopted both by the Geneva treaties and
the New York Convention.
The Geneva Protocol of 1923 in article 2, provided that ''the arbitral procedure,
including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of the
parties and by the law of the country in whose territory the arbitration takes place."'
The New York Convention maintains a simultaneous reference to the place of arbitration
'
'"' See article V(l)(d) of the New York convention Supra nolo 41 : REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9
at 83
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REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 8 1
.
Tills limited tlie number of nations whose laws could possibly compete for application as tlie lex arbitri
or tlie curial law See GARY B BORN Supra note 121 at 163
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as also to the place where the award is made.'^** The model law maintains this link with
1 79
the place of arbitration
In international commercial arbitration an arbitral tribunal can ignore compliance
with mandatory provisions of the law"*" of the forum or seat only to the extent permitted
by such law '**' A court of law is governed by the law of the countrv' in which it sits i.e.
the lex fori. This remains so despite the fact that the same court may be required, in a
particular dispute, to apply the law of some other country Though an arbitral tribunal is
not a court, it is at least analogous to a court of law in this respect Indeed it is important
to note that if the law of a particular country is prohibits arbitrations from being held
within its jurisdiction or territory, they cannot be lawfully be held there. ^
Almost all countries tend to maintain some degree of control on the arbitration
proceedings taking place within their jurisdiction and it is quite unlikely that national law
of a country would exempt an arbitral tribunal from compliance with the mandatory
'^* See Article V(l)(a).(d) and (e) of the New York Comcntion Supra note 41.
'
'^ Article 1(2): "The pro\isions of this Law, e.xcept articles 8, 9 . 35 and 36. apply only if the place of
arbitration is in tlie territory of this state."; Articles 8 and 9 deal with enforcement of the agreement and tlie
interim measures of protection respecti\ely while articles 35and 36 deals wiUi tJic recognition and
enforcement of tlie arbitral aw ard.
"
"A mandator* rule ... is an imperative provision of law w hich must be applied to an intematiomtl
relationship irrespecti\e of tlie law Uiat go\ems tliat rclationslup. To put it another way: mandaton. rules of
law are a matter of public policy ( ordre public) and moreover reflect a public policy so commanding that
they must be applied even if tlie general bod> of law to which they belong is not competent by application
of the relevant rule of conflict of laws '" See Mayer, Mandator* Rules Of Law in Inteniational Arbitration.
2 Arb. Int"l 274. 274-275 (1986).
The law of the countr> where tlic arbitration takes place provides Uic rules regulating tlie arbitration. "A
countr>- may regulate all activities in iis tcmior>. The parties can avoid the application of llie law of
arbitration of the countrv of the place of arbimuion if that law so provides, e.g. by permitting tJieni to
choose the rules of another countn or of an international convention. Even tlien. the other rules of
arbitration are applied by virtue of tlie place of arbitration." See Allan Philip. The Significance of the Place
of Arbitration in international Arbitration. 1985 Y.B Swed & Int'l Arb 37 . 39.
'^- See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 7 at 83.
65
provisions of its arbitration law"^' In case the parties or the arbitral tribunal ignore
compliance with the mandator\' requirements of the "lex forT the resulting award may be
declined recognition and enforcement
'*^"^ The varying of these mandatory requirements
from one national system of law to another and the desire for uniformity in the law
regulating international commercial arbitration has led to the advancement of the
delocalisation theory. This theory seeks to detach international commercial arbitration
from the control of the arbitral situs. ' It is, however, miportant to note that
delocalisation of an arbitration proceedings is possible only if permissible under the
arbitration law of the place of arbitration.
'^"^
In arbitrations conducted in a particular countr> . witliout any express agreement o\er tJie subject of
curial law. the la\\ of the arbitral situs proxidcs tJie curial Xzw and therefore must be consulted to detennine
the various legal issues it rcgulatcs(.S'//jPra note 142) The law of the place of arbitration iuid the law
intended b\ the parties to go\ em tlie arbitration compete for application as lex arhitn: Tliough it is imusual
for tlie parties to agree, in tlie agreement to arbitrate, on the issue of curial law ne\ertheless national laws
of many countries permit Uie parties to select a curial law. including a foreign curial law. One such example
is tlie English curial law. Sec DICEY & MORRIS. Supro note 169 at 580 - 81; It is important to note tliat
even in nations pcnnitting the selection of a foreign curial law. such a selection does not render the law of
the situs irrele\ant imd tlie mandator* requirements of the le.x fori ha\ e to be complied w itli.
'*"' See articles V. 1(a) and (d) of the New York Con\cnlion Supra note 41. "The tribunal cannot skire the
view tlKit tlie application of the mumcipal procedural law to an international arbitration like tlie present one
would infnnge upon such prerogatives as a State party to the proceedings b> \ irtue of its so\ ereign status.
Witliin the limits of international law, tlie judicial and otlier executive authorities in each jurisdiction do. as
a mater of both fact and of law. impose linutations on the sovereign immuiuiy of other states within such
jurisdictions. Clearly, in some legal systems the degree of control exercised by the courts o\er arbitral
proceedings is greater tlian in otiiers. and at times extensi\ c. By providing for arbitration as an exclusive
mechanism for resolving contractual disputes, the parties to an agreement. e\en if one of tliem is a state,
must, howe\'er. be presumed to lia\e intended to create an effectne remedy. Tlie effectiveness of an arbitral
award tliat lacks nationality - which it may if the law of the arbitration is international law - generally is
smaller tlian the award founded on tlie proceduriU law of a specific legal s\steni and pcUlaking its
nationality." See British Petroleum Company (Libya) v. The Governmenl ofLibyan Arab Repiilic, V
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration. 143. 147 (1980)
" Tliese arbitrations go by \arious names, for instance supra national arbitrations, denational arbitrations,
delocalised arbitration etc
It should be noted tliat most of tlie practitioners and parties tend to conform to tlie local rules as a matter
of prudence. "Ha\ing tlius reaffinned tliat arbitration ma> be detached from the law of the situs. I liasten to
add tliat I doubt tins feature of international arbitration has much of an impact in practice. Competent
counsel will in all cases seek to have tlie process conform to local rules as a matter of piiidence." See
PAULSSON. DELOCALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION. 57;
Belgium is one of the countnes which has attempted a substantial degree of delocalisation. Article 1717 of
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The seat theory therefore confines the arbitral award, instead of letting it to float
in the transnational environment with no connection whatsoever with any system of law,
in well defined and easily identifiable legal system which both assists and controls it to
some degree.'^" This means that whenever an international commercial arbitration is held
the local laws of the venue must be taken into account to comply with any or all
mandatory requirements for a valid arbitration award and secondly, all forums may not be
suitable for international commercial arbitration.
B. Capacity
The parties to an agreement to arbitrate must possess the capacity to enter into
such an agreement In case the parties lack the capacity to agree to arbitrate differences
the resulting award may be declined recognition and enforcement by virtue of the New
York Convention. '^^
The rules of law by which the capacity of the parties, to enter into an agreement to
arbitrate, is to be determined are by no means uniform and vary from one jurisdiction to
another. For a natural person, capacity may depend upon nationality or place of residence
or domicile while for a corporation the place of incorporation or the place of business
tlie Code Judiaare provides tliat a Belgian court can take cognizance of a request for annulment if one of
tlie parties to tlie dispute decided by the arbitral award is eitlier a physical person liaving a Belgian
nationality or is resident in Belgium or is a legal entity created in Belgium or ha\ ing a branch or any other
establishment in Belgium. The judicial control of such awards therefore comes to the courts of tlie countr>-
or countries where recognition and enforcement are sought.; for shortcomings of the dclocalisiiiion tlieory
see generally Allan Philip. Supro note 181 at 39-40; See generally REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9at
81-88.
'^" See BankMellal v. Hellmki Techniki S.A. [1984] Q.B. 291; Tlie only disad\anlage of the scat theon is
the reference it makes to tlie law of the place of arbitration wluch \ancs from one state to anotlier. See
REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 90.91.
188
See Article V( 1 ) of the Ne\\ York Convention Supra note 4
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might play the dominant role It is important to note that though the New York
Convention states that the capacity, to enter into an agreement to arbitrate, is to be
determined under the law applicable to the parties, also known as the personal law'*^'', it
nowhere provides a mechanism of determining this law. The issue is therefore to be
resolved by the conflict of the laws rules of the place of enforcement.''^"
National systems of law may impose restrictions on the capacity of the state
and/or state agencies to enter into arbitration agreements In some countries, for instance
Germany, United Kingdom and Switzerland, the national law does not impose any
restrictions on the capacity of the state or its agencies to enter into agreements to arbitrate
while the national law of other countries, Belgium and Saudi Arabia for instance,
imposes a complete restriction both on the state and its agencies to enter into agreements
to arbitrate differences. Other countries like the United States have adopted a middle
course.'^' In the United States though the state agencies can enter into an arbitration
agreement no such agreement can be made by the Federal Government. Likewise in
France the state agencies may validly submit disputes arising out of industrial or
'^' Tliis may at times differ from the law go\erning tJie Jirbitration
It is important to note that tJie conflict rules \ar} from one jurisdiction to another and range . in case of a
physical person from tlie law goxermng the nationality to donucile or habitiuil residence and m case of a
legal person, from tlie place of incorporation to tJie place of business. Further tlicre are countries like \hc
United States for instance do not ha\e a specific personal law for dctennimng tJie capacity to enter into
agreements and detennine this capacity according to the law of the place where the agreement is concluded
or the law goxerning tlie agreement. See American Law Institute. Reslatement ofthe Law Second- Conflict
ofLaws 2d (St. Paul. Minn.. 1971) Sect. 198 /V; Sects. 187 - 188. ; It ma> be questioned whetlier tlie words
"under tlie law applicable to lliem" supersede the conflict rules of the place of recognition and enforcement
and would oblige tlie enforcing states to conceixe a personal law for the sole purpose of the provisions of
article V(l)(a) of the New York Convention According to some autliors lliis is unnecessarv According to
Uieni article V( l)(a) gives a half-way conflict rule as the personal law to be applied is still to be determined
by the conflict rules of the forum. Sec VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 276. 277.
'" See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 73.74.
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commercial disputes to international arbitration, the legal persons of public law may do
so only if the restriction is waived by a decree
The law and practice pertaining to the capacity of a state or its agencies to enter
into arbitration agreements is neither uniform nor satisfactory A solution was attempted
by the European Convention which provided that persons considered to be 'legal persons
of public law' under the law applicable to them should have the right to enter into
arbitration agreements This, however, had limited effect as the countries could limit this
provision at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the convention.
An effort was also made by the 1989 Swiss Act to deal with problem of states or
state agencies attempting to repudiate an arbitration agreement claiming lack of capacity
to enter into such agreements. .^^'^ It provided that in case the party to an arbitration
agreement was a state or its agency then such state or state agency cannot rely on its
national law to challenge its capacity to enter into such an agreement or the arbitrability
of the dispute covered by such agreement. The Act was passed to ensure that an
arbitration award made in Switzerland would be valid under the Swiss law even if the
state or its agency claimed, under its national law, lack of capacity to enter into such an
agreement. It is however, thought by some authors that this provision of the Swiss law
cannot, as lex arbitri, override the country's own law This is more particularly so when
'^" See generally Id. at 74, 75.
European Convention Article II provides: " (1) In ilie case referred to in Article I. paragraph 1. of tliis
Convention, legal persons considered by the law which is applicable to them as "legal persons of public
law" liave the right to conclude valid arbitration agreements.
(2) On sigmng, ratifying or acceding to tlus coinention cUiy State shall be entitled to declare tliat it limits
tlie above faculty to such conditions as may be stated in its declaration." See Supra note 65 at 633. 634
''^ The Swiss PIL Act, Chap. 12. Art. 177(2): For translation see 6 International Business Law Journal 805
(1989).
1
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the arbitration is being conducted within the jurisdiction of the country concerned. The
concept of capacity further differs from and unlike the concept of sovereign immunity,
which is deemed to be waived by the act of entering into the agreement to arbitrate,
cannot be consented to as the power to make such a decision itself requires legal
•. 196
capacity.
C. Law applicable to the validity of the arbitration agreement
An arbitration agreement may either be contained in an arbitration clause, which
forms a part of the main contract, or it may take the form of a specially drawn submission
agreement. Where the agreement to arbitrate is contained in a clause of the main
agreement, though it is deemed to have an existence separate and independent of the
main contract, it is usually governed by the same law which governs the substantive
rights of the parties under the main contract Though the position is same in case of a
submission agreement, it may at times be governed by a different system of laws than
that governing the main contract as it does not form a part of the main contract and is in
fact entered into after the dispute arises.
'^^
The need for a valid arbitration agreement as a precondition to a valid award has
been emphasized by both the UNCITRAL model law^'^^ and the New York
Convention. The challenges to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate are made either
195
See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 75.
'''Id.
'''
Id. at 16
'^'* See Articles 34(2)(a)(i) and 36(l)(a)(i).
'^^ See Article V(l)(a) Supro note 41.
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at the beginning of the arbitral process i e at the time of the recognition and enforcement
of the agreement or towards the end of the process at the stage of recognition and
enforcement of the resuUing award.
For a jurisdictional challenge to be considered an arbitral tribunal must first
determine the law applicable to the arbitration agreement This in turn requires the
determination of the conflict of laws rules applicable which is done by looking at the
provisions of various international treaties and conventions Under the provisions of
article V(l)(a) of the New York Conventions an arbitration award may be refused
recognition and enforcement if the arbitration agreement "is not valid under the law to
which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made."^^° Thus at the award enforcement stage the
provisions of article V(l)(a) override the contrary domestic conflict rules and requires the
validity of the arbitration agreement to be determined in light of the law chosen by the
parties. Where there is no express agreement as to the law governing the arbitration
agreement, the validity of the agreement has to be evaluated under the law of the place of
arbitration.
^°'
^°*^
Article IX (1) of tlie European Comention contains substantially similar provisions. See Supra note 70
Tliougli it is possible tliat an arbitral award may be made at a place other tlian \\\q one where Uie
arbitration was held for the purposes of the present discussion it is assumed llwt tlic place of arbitration and
that of Uie award are llie same. Tlie result of lliis pro\ision is Uiat in the enforcement proceedings under Uie
con\ention the smne lau can be applied to the agreement, the procedure and the award making llie practical
applicability of the con\ention and the legal framework regulating international commercial arbitration
much simpler. See VAN DEN BERG Supra note 14 at 294.
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D Law governing the substantive issues
With the international law giving primacy to the principle of party autonomy, the
parties to an arbitration agreement have the freedom to choose for themselves the law that
would govern their contract. This principle of party autonomy has been generally
welcomed by various authors and has been recognized and accepted by various national
systems of law,^°^ international conventions^""' and international arbitral institutions like
the ICC/^""^ It is, however, important to note that this concept of party autonomy is subject
to the qualifications of bonafides and public policy limitations. '
"
Failure of the parties to agree on the law applicable to the substantive issues in dispute
gives rise to the difficult task of determining this governing law. In such circumstances it
may be possible to infer this choice of law from the terms of the contract and the
circumstances surrounding it.""*" This determination of the applicable law by the arbitral
tribunal, by looking at the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding it,
is known as the tacit, implied, inferred or implicit choice of law. This tacit choice of
"°"
"... despite llieir differences, common law. civil law. mid socuilisi countries have all equally been
affected by the mo\emeni towards Uie rule of allowing the parties to choose the law to go\ern Oieir
contractual relations. Tliis dexelopment has come about independentK in e\ er> counLr> and w lUiout any
concerted effort by the nations of the world: it is Uie result of separate, contemporaneous and pragmatic
evolutions witliin tlie \arious national s> steins of law." See LEW Supra note 157.
'^^
Tlie European Convention of 1961 in article Vll pro\ides that "It] he parties sliall be free to detemiine.
by agreement, tlie law to be applied b> tJie arbitrators to tlie substance of the dispute ( . .
.
)."" See Supra note
65 at 647: Tlie UNCITRAL model law in article 33.1 pro\ides that "[t]he arbitral tnbunal shall apply tlie
law designated by the parties as tlie law applicable to tlie substance of the dispute,"
ICC rules article 13.3 pro\ides: "The parties shall be free to determine tlie law to be applied by the
arbitrator to the merits of the dispute."
205
See generally REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 at 100.101.
206 ..
'Where tlie intention of the parties to a contract with regard to tlie law go\erning tlie contract is not
expressed in words, tlieir intention is to be inferred from the temis ;uid nature of the contract, jmd from tlie
general circumstances of the case, and such inferred intention detennines tlie proper law of the contract."
See Comopgnie d' Annement Manlime v. Conipagnie Twusienne de Navigation SA [1971] A.C. 572. 595.
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applicable law involves a degree of artificiality particularly in circumstances where it is
apparent that the parties have not given any thought to the issue.
^'' Thus the applicable
law should be determined by this mechanism only when it is clear that it is the actual
choice of the parties to the arbitration agreement
In order to determine the applicable substantive law an arbitral tribunal first has to
make a selection of a choice of law rule. It has been argued by some authors that the
'locus arhitrf not only governs the arbitration, the validity of the arbitration agreement
but also the conflict of law rules to be applied by the arbitral tribunal in situations where
the tribunal has to determine the law applicable to the substantial issue in dispute. '^"'^ Most
of the nations permit a substantial amount of discretion for determining the appropriate
set of conflict of laws rules and thereby arriving at the appropriate law applicable to the
substantive dispute.' Nonetheless, national laws of some nations requires the arbitrators
to apply the local conflict of laws rules/" In such a situation if the local law is not
complied with, the resulting award may be refijsed recognition and enforcement under
-'^'"
See REDFERN & HUNTER Supra note 9 al 1 23.
^°^ See JafTer\'. The English Proper Law Doctrine and tlie EEC Convention, 133 l.C.L.Q. 53 1 at 545
(1984); Tlie Rome Convention in paragraph 1 of article 3 proxides tliat a choice of law must be "express or
demonstrated witli reasonable certainty b\ the terms of the contract or Uie circumstances of the case." See
[1980] Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L266/1
-"^ GARY B. BORN Supra note 121 at 162
'"' Article 28(2) of the UNCITRAL model law pro\ides that where tiie parties fail to designate Uie
applicable law tlie "arbitral tribunal sluill apph the law determined by the conflict of laws rules wliich it
considers applicable": For European countries which follow a simihu" practice sec Mann. Le.x Facit
Arbittrum. 2 Arb. IntM 241. 248 (1986).
In England tlie national law requires tlie arbitrators to appl\ tJie conflict of laws mles applicable in
English courts. See Mann, Id.: Article 187(l)of the Swiss law on private international law requires the
application of the rules of law with which the case has the closest connection. See A. Buclier & P Tsclianz.
International Arbitration in Switzerland 95- 96 (1989).
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the provisions of the New York Convention as it would be set aside by the courts of the
situs acting under their national law.
Apart from implicit or implied choice of law and the application of the
aforementioned conflict of law rules, a criteria widely used to determine the applicable
law is based on the choice of forum or sifns by the parties Where the parties do not make
any express choice of the law applicable to the substantive dispute but do designate the
arbitral situs, it is often assumed that they intended the law of the situs to be the law
governing the substance of the dispute. ^'^
Despite tlie fact tliat the \ enuc of international arbitration is often cliosen by the parlies for reasons of
neutralit) and/or conxenience and witliout any intention of applying tlie national law of that venue to tlie
substanti\e dispute, tlus practice is e.\tensi\cl\ followed b\ the arbitrators.
CHAPTER V
Forum Non-Conveniens
The forum, place or situs of arbitration agreed upon by the parties in their
arbitration agreement may. at the time the dispute arises, turn into an inconvenient forum
in terms of location of witnesses, materials, books and other evidence. Changes in the law
of the situs, subsequent to the agreement, which drastically change the procedural and
substantive rights of the parties may turn a most convenient situs into a most
inconvenient one as the choice of venue is often considered as an express choice of curial
law." " This raises the issue as to whether an arbitral situs may be transferred to another
jurisdiction or judicial system on the finding that the forum contractually agreed upon is
an inconvenient forum - forum non-conveniens.''^ This, as a necessary consequence,
raises the question: Can the change of an arbitral situs be made subject to the condition
that the curial law of arbitration be that of the forum initially agreed upon?"'"^ Another
issue important to the present discussion is: What are the circumstances that justify the
finding of forum non- conveniens?
"'' Much more goes into the selection of an arbitral situs than the personal comfort of the arbitrators and the
lawyers. "An express choice of forum by the parties to a contract necessarily implies an intention that their
disputes shall be settled in accordance with the procedural law of the selected forum and operates as if it
were also an express choice of the curial law of the contract." See Compagnie D ' Armement Maritime SA
Supra note 206.
See Andrew Rogers, Forum Non Conveniens in Arbitration, 4 Arb. Int'l 240, 240-241(1988).
Though lex arbitri and curial law are often used mterchangeably this question is mdicative of a possible
split between the curial law and the lex arbitri.
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In the United States the matter first came up before the Supreme Court in Ihe
Brenmn v. Zapata Off-Shore (>>/"' wherein the Supreme Court expressed the opinion
that the forum selection causes are prima facie valid and are to be enforced unless the
resisting party shows that the enforcement is unreasonable under the circumstances A
forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement was confronted by the Supreme Court
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.^^^ wherein the majority in the Supreme Court expressed
the view that "an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is in effect, a
specialized kind of a forum selection clause that posits not only the situs but also the
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute/'^'^ It is important to note that in this case
the view taken by the court regarding the form selection clause in relation to arbitration
"'^ 407 U.S 1 ( 1971 ); It is important to note tliat the fonim selection clause invohed in tJiis case related to
litigating in a particular foruni and arbitration. ne\ erihcless it laid dow n tlie foundiition for tlie enforcement
of the forum selection clauses wluch had till such time been frowned upon by the courts.; Tliis case
in\ oKed a tow ing contract between the petitioner, a German corporation, and Uic respondent, an American
company, under wliich the petitioner was to tow a drilling rig form Louisiana to Adriatic Sea. Tlie contract
provided for settlement of disputes before the London Court of Justice. Tlie rig was damaged by a storm
while in tlie Gulf of Mexico Tlie respondent, in contra\ention to the contract, brought a suit in Admiralt>'
in Uie United States District Court in Tampa. The petitioner ino\'cd to dismiss on grounds of foruni non-
conveniens or for a stay pending submission to an English court. The motion was demed by tlie district
court and is decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals on tlie basis tliat tlie accident occurred in waters
within die junsdiclion of the court, considerable number of potential witnesses including tlie Zapata crew
men lived in die Gulf area, preparation of \oyage. inspection and repair load been carried out in llie Gulf
area, Uie testimony of the Bremen crew was available there and last but not the least England had no
interest in Uie dispute. On appeal llie Supreme court held that far little weight and effect liad been gnen to
tlie forum clause by the courts below and said that "tlie choice of that forum was made in im ann's length
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing
reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts." At p. 12. Tlie burden of proof was
placed on tlie part> contesting iJie forum clause to show that "enforcement would be unreasonable and
unjust, or tliat the clause was nnalid for such rciisons as fraud or o\er-reaclung." At p 14.
417 U.S. 506 (1974); Tins case imolving a contract for the sale of trademarks between an American
corporation and a German citizen required tlie parties to submit aii\ dispute for arbitration to Uie
IntemaUonal Chamber of Commerce in Paris.
''^Mat 680.
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was identical to the view taken by it in the Bremen case involving curial proceedings and
the issue of forum non-conveniens did not directly arise
'
The issue of forum non-conveniens directly arose for the consideration of the
Court in Sam Reisfeld & Son Import v. S.A. Eleco^^^. In this case the appellant was the
exclusive sales representative of the respondent and the agency agreement contained an
arbitration clause which provided for all disputes to be decided by arbitration in Coutrai
in Belgium. When the dispute arose the appellant commenced action in the United States
contending that the forum specified in the arbitration clause was so unreasonable that "it
either vitiates the arbitration clause or requires transfer to a more neutral situs
"
Denying the contention the court remarked;
"Reisfeld' s attack falters on its initial premise that the Bremen
unreasonableness test is applicable to arbitration clauses Rather, we agree with
the district court that the enforceability of the arbitration clause at issue is
governed exclusively by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act [ .] Under
the Act, a party seeking to avoid arbitration must allege and prove that the
arbitration clause itself was a product of fraud, coercion, or 'such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of the contract/ [ . .]. This stringent standard
has not been modified by the Supreme Court's [. . ,] decision in Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 The court in Scherk upheld a stay pending arbitration
even though the plaintiffs asserted a claim under the federal securities law. The
references to Bremen in that case were made to emphasize the court's rejection of
a provincial approach in favor of the policy of giving effect to the agreement of
the parties in international transactions, not to incorporate Bremen standards
wholesale to situs selections in arbitration clauses. If any thing Scherk strengthens
defendants' position by insisting upon liberal enforcement of arbitration clauses in
multi-national contexts. Since Bremen is inapplicable, the district court did not
219
See Andrew Rogers. Supra note 214 ai 243.
^'^530F. 2d. 679(1976).
Id. at 680; In contending tlic Belgian situs to be unreasonable the appellant relied upon defendant's
economic dominance in the area and llie incon\enience and the expose that it would encounter if forced to
arbitrate in a forum both remote and foreign in language.
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reach the question whether the selection of Coutrai was unreasonable under the
circumstances here presented
""'
The approach taken by the ReisfeId coun in rejecting the application of the
Bremen principle was considerably softened by the decision in Mitusbishi Motor
Corporation v. So/er Chrysler-Plymouth Inc^'^^ wherein the majority was of the opinion
that the mere appearance of an anti-trust dispute is not sufficient to invalidate a selected
forum and accepted that a "party may attempt making a showing that would warrant
setting aside the forum-selection clause""" on the grounds laid down in the Bremen case
i.e. the agreement was affected by fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining
power. Absent these considerations the resisting party must prove that the enforcement
would be unreasonable and unjust or that the "proceedings in the contractual forum will
be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party] will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court.""'''
In National Iranian Oil Company v. Ashland Oil Inc.^^^ the arbitration clause
provided for arbitration in Tehran When the dispute arose the Iranian company
appointed an arbitrator but the Americans refused to participate in any proceedings in
Tehran because of the perceived dangers. The plaintiffs, the Iranian company then
commenced action in the Federal District Court seeking order to compel arbitration in
Mississippi. The defendants responded by filing a counter claim alleging tortuous
'" Id. at 680. 681; Tliis opinion of the court was cilcd wit appro\al in USM Corporation v. GKNfastener
Ltd. 574 2d. 17(1978).
"^73 U.S. 614 (1985).
'"^M 632.
"V^. at 632.633.
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interference with and breach of contract In these proceedings before the Federal District
Court the plaintiffs argued that as compliance with the selected forum was impossible ,
the forum selection provision should be severed from the arbitration clause and the
essential part of the bargain, i e. settlement of disputes by arbitration, be complied with.
The court distinguished this case form the Bremen case on the basis that the forum
selection clause in that case did not relate to the site of arbitration The court applying the
/?e/5/e/J principle, ''that the forum selection clause contained in an arbitration provision
must be enforced even if unreasonable'', denied the plaintiffs claim. " The court further
laid down the requirements for impossibility or commercial impracticability. First, the
facts relied upon for asserting impossibility should not have been in the knowledge of the
affected party at the time of the making of the contract. ^^^ Secondly, the principle of
forum non-conveniens cannot be relied upon if it is the result of parties own fault.
The court ftirther said that the contract provided that Tehran is to be the forum of
arbitration unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties and therefore the court cannot
order arbitration in Mississippi, unless the parties agreed to it, as it had no power to
rewrite the contract.
'^^^
" 817 F. 2d. 326; Tliis case liad its genesis in the seizure of llie US Embassy in Tehran following tlic
Islamic rexolution in Iran Tlic American companies recci\ ed Iranian oil already in transit at tlie time of
tlie seizure of tlie US cmbassv and refused to pay for tlie same.
" It is important to note tliat the court conceded that under tlie FAA tlie court did not lia\'e any power to
compel arbitration in Teiiran. It had the power to compel arbitration onh in tliose countries which were
signatories to tlie New York Convention.
" In court's view it was impossible tiiat the plaintiff could not liave foreseen, at tlie time of the contract,
tliat Teliran ma> become a forum where it would be impossible for tlie Atnencans to participate in any
proceedings. At p 333.
The court was of the opinion that tlie plaintiff being a part of tlie revolutionary government the plaintiff
was responsible for tlie chain of events. At p 333, 334.
230
Tlie court concluded: "Notw ithstiinding considerations of convenience", one caimot reasonably argue
lliat die parties" contract contemplated arbitration in Mississippi. Tlie contract's provision that tlie
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It has, however, been argued by some authors that the test of forum non-
conveniens in light of a forum selection clause should be taken form the majority opinion
in Mitsubishi and to succeed the applicant must prove that the ditTiculties that he would
face in the contractual forum would tantamount to denial of a proper and fair opportunity
to have his case heard. ^^^' ''[I]t is a well established practice of municipal and
international tribunals to deny enforcement of choice of forum clauses, when radical
changes have fijndamentally altered the circumstances relied upon when the clauses were
negotiated.""
-) T "1
Can'alho v. Hull BIyth (Angola) Ltd.^ illustrates the practice of English courts.
In this case the forum selection clause provided that the District Court of Luanda, to the
exclusion of all other courts, shall be competent to adjudicate the litigation of all claims.
At the time of the contract Luanda was under Portuguese rule and there was a right to
appeal to the Supreme Court in Lisbon. Two years after the contract was entered into
Angola became an independent country under the control of a revolutionary government
and though there was a District Court at Luanda the system of appointment ofjudges was
arbitration was to be in Teliran unless othenvise agreed' suggests Uiat. were Iran to become inconvenient
or unacceptable to one or both parties, no other fonini was to be available unless mutually agreed upon.
Because arbitration is a creature of contract, we cannot rewrite the agreement of the panics and order tJie
proceedings to be held in Mississippi " At 334.
' ' see Andrew Rogers Supra note 214 at 246: The autlior is of tlie opinion Uiat tlie court was unduly
impressed by the nationality of the plaintiff.
'
' See Hakan Berglin, Tlie Iranian Forum Clause Decisions of tlie Iran-United States Claims Tnbunal, 3
Arb Intl 46.48-49.
'^Ml979]3 AllE.R. 280.
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completely different The British court held that it was no longer the one contemplated by
the parties and accordingly the plaintiff was not bound to litigate only in Angola
The Canadian position is illustrated by Ship A/ v Sea Pearl v. Seven Seas Dry
Cargo Shipping Corporaiion"^' wherein Justice Pratte, delivering the judgement of the
court, remarked:
"Prima facie an application to stay proceedings commenced in the Federal Court
in defiance of an undertaking to submit a dispute to arbitration or to a foreign court must
succeed because, as a rule, contractual undertakings must be honored. In order to depart
from that prima facie rule "strong reasons' are needed, that is to say, reasons that are
sufficient to support the conclusion that it would not be reasonable or just, in the
circumstances, to keep the plaintiff to his promise and enforce the contract he made with
the defendant. [..]"^^^
India is perhaps the only country in the world where applicants have been
successful in securing a place of hearing other than the contractually agreed forum In
Ms V O Tractroexport Moscow v. Ms Tarapore and Co.' the applicant contended that
the restrictions on the availability of the foreign exchange had made it impossible for him
to take witnesses to the contractually agreed forum or to otherwise properly conduct
proceedings there. Allowing the application the court remarked:
"The current restrictions imposed by the Government of India on the
availability of foreign exchange of which judicial notice can be taken will make it
virtually impossible for the Indian Firm to take witnesses to Moscow for
examination before the Arbitral tribunal and to otherwise properly conduct the
proceedings there Thus, the proceedings before that Tribunal are likely to be in
23-4
According to some autliors tlie English courts, while maintaining llie sanctit> of the doctrine o^pacta
sunt sen'ancla. make more realistic and practical approach w hile dealing w ith re\ olutionar> changes tlian
tlie one taken by ihe Ashland couri. See Andrew Rogers Supra note 214 at 247.
^^- 139D.L.R 3d 669.
^^^ Mat 681.
AIR 1971 S.C. 1: in tliis case tlie Indian firm had purchased tractors from tlie Russian company. The
contract provided for arbitration of disputes before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the USSR
Cliamber of Commerce m Moscow. When tlie disputes arose tlie Russian compain commenced Jirbitration
proceedings in Moscow
.
Tlie Indian firm brought acuon to enjoin the Russian compain from proceeding
ftirtlier witli arbitration.
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effect ex parte The High Court was, therefore, right in exercising discretion in the
matter of granting an interim injunction in favor of the Indian Firm " "
In Refiiisagar Power Co. v. General electric Co which also involved an
appHcation for the change of venue based on the contention that financial hardship had
made the contractual forum inconvenient the Bombay High Court expressed the
following opinion:
"The mere fact that the evidence which the respondents desire to lead is
from this country is no answer to the claim of the petitioner that the arbitration
proceedings must continue and the suit instituted by the respondents should be
stayed. As regards the difficulty in securing the foreign exchange, the record
indicates that the respondents had made an application to the Reserve Bank of
India for grant of foreign exchange for defending the proceedings before the
arbitrators and have succeeded in securing the foreign exchange. The mere fact
that the proceedings before arbitrators are to be conducted outside India might
cause some hardship to the respondents is no ground to by-pass the arbitration
clause contained in the contract. In case the party is permitted to resile from the
arbitration clause on such ground, then the international trade and commerce
would come to a standstill. The respondents have entered into the contract with
open eyes and it is futile to them to claim that they now find it difficult to
participate in the arbitration proceedings."
2iS
Id. at 12.
-^^ 1985 A.I.R. 1156 (Bom.)
CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
Limited powers of arbitral tribunals with regard to enforcement of awards
compels recourse to the national courts of the country where the award is sought to be
enforced. The detailed rules of procedure adopted by these courts vary from one
jurisdiction to another and this brings into picture the role of international conventions
which seek to achieve certain degree of uniformity. Moreover, absent these international
treaties and conventions there is no obligation on a state to recognize an arbitration award
made in the territory of another state or not discriminate against a foreign arbitral award
vis-a-vis a domestic arbitral award.
These international treaties and conventions, in making an effort towards
international enforcement of arbitral awards, place a special emphasis on the arbitral situs
- the country where the arbitration proceedings took place and the award was rendered.
The most important of these conventions, the New York Convention of 1958. permits the
signatories to make a commercial reservation and require reciprocity. By subscribing to
the reciprocity requirement the contracting countries agree to give effect to the awards
made in the territories of the member countries only.
The commercial reservation permits a member state to apply the convention only
to disputes arising out of relationships considered to be commercial under its national
laws. As a result of this reservation even an award made in one member state may not be
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enforceable in the territory of another member state if the relationship though commercial
under the national law of the arbitral situs, is not deemed to be so under the law of the
enforcing state. This makes it imperative to have regard to the definition of ^commercial
relationship' under the national law\s of both the arbitral situs and the state where the
award may be sought to be enforced.
In addition to these reservations the limited and exhaustive grounds of refusing
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards also place a special emphasis on the
arbitral situs. An arbitral award maybe refused recognition and enforcement if the
arbitration agreement is invalid under the law, failing any agreement of the parties to that
effect, of the place of arbitration. Non-conformity with the law of the place of arbitration
regarding the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and/or the procedure may also result in
the refusal of recognition and enforcement
.
Recognition and enforcement may also be refused if the award has not become
binding on the parties. To determine whether the award has become binding or not resort
has to be made to the law applicable to the arbitration agreement which is the law of the
arbitral situs. It is important to note that the national law of each jurisdiction prescribes
different requirements for an award to be declared binding.""'^ The arbitral situs therefore
determines the requirements for a binding award.
Setting aside or suspension of an arbitral award by a competent authority of the
country in which or under the law of which it was made may also result in refusal of
recognition and enforcement of the award. It is important to note that the competent
authority mentioned in Article V(l)(e) of the New York Convention is virtually always
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the national court of the arbitral situs. The phrase 'under the law of which ' the award was
made was intended to deal with the theoretical proposition ot" the parties agreeing to
subject the award to a law other than the law of the place of arbitration.
The European Convention of 1961 does not address the question of enforcement
of arbitration awards. Where an award falls under the scope of both the New York
Convention and the European Convention, the party seeking enforcement has to comply
with the requirements of the New York Convention and the party resisting enforcement
may invoke the grounds contained in the New York Convention. Further like the New
York Convention, the European Convention also contains limited grounds on which an
award may be set aside. It is important to note that these are similar to those contained in
the New York Convention. Another notable feature of the European Convention is that
even if an award has been set aside under the national law of the place of arbitration,
enforcement can be declined only if this setting aside has been on one of the grounds
mentioned in the Convention.
The Washington or the ICSID Convention excludes the application of national
law on arbitration as ICSID arbitration can take place only at the ICSID facilities at
Washington and are governed solely by the rules and regulations framed under the
Convention. The Panama convention on the other hand applies only to awards made in
the territories of other member states. In other words the member states require the
condition of reciprocity for the enforcement of arbitral awards. In addition to that the
Panama Convention contains limited and exhaustive grounds for setting aside of
In some jurisdictions the award becomes binding only when the court has granted leave for the
enforcement of the award.
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arbitration awards. These grounds are almost identical with those contained in the New
York Convention and place a similar emphasis on the place of arbitration.
Limited powers of arbitral tribunals with regard to both proper and efficient
conduct of arbitration proceedings and enforcement of awards compel resort to national
courts of the place of arbitration. In fact effectiveness of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution depends on the cooperation and assistance it receives from the judicial system
of the place of arbitration. The extent to which the national courts of the state of
arbitration can assist in enforcing the award and/or proper and efficient conduct of
arbitration proceedings depends on and is regulated by its national law.
Support of the national courts of the place of arbitration may be required at
beginning of the process itself. At the beginning of the process this support manifests
itself in the shape of enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate and/or the establishment
of the arbitral tribunal. As regards the enforcement of the arbitration agreement, various
international treaties and conventions play a very important role in addition to the
national law of the arbitral situs. If the arbitral situs is a state member to the New York
Convention the national courts of the situs would refer the parties to arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration agreement unless they find the agreement to be void,
invalid or incapable of being performed. Where, however, the country of arbitration is not
a member to any international convention, it's national law plays the primary role in the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement.
The assistance of the courts with regard to the appointment of the arbitral tribunal
is primarily needed where the parties are unable to reach an agreement to make such an
appointment and the arbitration agreement does not confer an express power on any one
«f)
party to make such an appointment. The only alternative in such a situation is to seek the
assistance of the courts of the situs which, under the principles of international law,
possess the necessary jurisdiction and power to enforce the arbitration agreement and/or
appoint the arbitral tribunal.
At times there is threat of destruction of the subject matter of arbitration which
gives rise to the need for immediate and temporary protection of rights and property
which form this subject matter. Under the general principles of international law the
national courts of the arbitral situs are the competent courts to grant this interim relief. In
cases where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted there is no option but to
make an application to the national courts of the place of arbitration. Even in cases where
the arbitral tribunal is in existence resort has to be had to the national courts of the place
of arbitration despite the fact that the national laws of most of the states confer upon the
tribunals powers to make orders for the protection and preservation of property and rights
which form the subject matter of the dispute. This is because of the fact that in event of
non-compliance by a recalcitrant party an arbitral tribunal can do nothing more than
drawing an adverse inference, against such party, in its award. This inability of an arbitral
tribunal to enforce orders of interim relief becomes more prominent in cases where the
property forming the subject matter of dispute is in the possession of third parties who are
aliens to the arbitration agreement and thus beyond the jurisdiction and power of the
arbitral tribunal.
The extent of interim relief which these national courts may be willing to grant
and the circumstances under which these courts take jurisdiction vary from one country
to another. While some states are more than willing to extend judicial support to arbitral
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tribunals in preserving and protecting rights and property pending final disposal on merits
in other states it is thought that the New York Convention bars judicial intervention ol
any kind. Though this problem is not encountered in states where the national law
specifically provides for judicial support to arbitration the extent of support available
nevertheless varies from one jurisdiction to another. While some states grant pre-award
attachment of assets in an ex-parte hearing in other states this kind of relief is frowned
upon. Jurisdictions like England even provide for security for costs. It is worth noting that
even in states where the courts are not hesitant to grant interim relief, requirements to be
complied with in order to sustain and enforce the order of interim relief are varied. The
circumstances under which these national courts assume jurisdicfion to order interim
measures of protection also vary from one jurisdiction to another. While some courts take
jurisdiction only where the arbitration proceedings are being conducted in their territories
other courts are willing to take jurisdiction if their national law is the curial law despite
the fact that they may have no relation with the parties or the subject matter of the dispute
whatsoever. The circumstances and requirements for orders of inspections or technical
survey by experts and interim custody of goods also vary from one jurisdiction to
another.
All legal systems of the world exercise some degree of control and supervision
over the arbitration proceedings taking place in their territories. Even countries like
France which have a non-interventionist tradition provide emergency relief where there is
a strong evidence of the arbitrator having been bribed by the other party or when the
proceedings are conducted in a manner patently unjust to the other party. Though the
extent of this control and supervision is debatable there is a general consensus that
X8
minimum standards of fairness and justice should be maintained. This judicial
supervision is exercised by providing for challenge or review of arbitral awards. The
from which this challenge may take varies from one jurisdiction to another. It may take
form of an appeal whereby a request is made to the court to vacate or vary an award on a
point of law. It may take the form of an application seeking the award to be varied or
remitted back to the arbitral tribunal for revision. Moreover the challenge to the legality
and the validity of an arbitral award has to be addressed to the courts of the place of
arbitration on the grounds provided by the national law. which vary from one jurisdiction
to another.
It is important to note that the party challenging an arbitration award can either
wait for an action for enforcing the award and then assert any of the grounds, for
refusing recognition and enforcement, contained in the New York Convention or it may
bring an action challenging the legality and validity of the award in the courts of the
arbitral situs in which case it can assert the grounds available under the national law of
the situs in addition to the grounds of challenge available under the New York
Convention.
The role of public policy in the arbitral process cannot be ignored or taken lightly.
If ignored or taken lightly it may result in the award being denied recognition and
enforcement. Limitations imposed by public policy on arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution are denoted by the expression 'arbitrability'. Each state, having regard to it's
social and economic policy, decides which disputes are capable of being resolved by
arbitration and which are to be reserved to the exclusive domain of the courts. This in an
international scenario means balancing competing policy considerations. This results in
sy
situations where the dispute though arbitrable under the national law of the arbitral situs
may not be capable of resolution by arbitration under the law of the place of enforcement.
In these cases the award may be denied recognition and enforcement by the courts of the
place of enforcement. In case the dispute is not arbitrable under the national law of the
place of arbitration the resulting award would be set aside by the national courts of such a
country thereby supplying a ground for declining recognition and enforcement of the
award. It is important to note that some jurisdictions like the United States hold the
disputes, which are not arbitrable in a domestic scene, to be capable of resolution by
arbitration in an international scenario. This policy increases the attractiveness of these
jurisdictions as an arbitral situs for international arbitrations involving anti-trust laws.
The most important factor in an arbitral process is the law of the arbitral situs. As
the venue in international arbitration is selected for its neutrality, the law governing the
substantive issues may be different from that of the place of arbitration but the
proceedings of the tribunal would be governed by the law of the situs. Though
theoretically the principle of party autonomy permits the parties to agree to a procedural
law other than that of the situs of arbitration, the mandatory requirements of the law of
the situs have to be complied with. Non-compliance with these mandatory requirements
may result in the award being set aside by the national courts of the country of
arbitration.
The law of the arbitral situs governs the most important aspects of an arbitral
process like the validity of the arbitration agreement, arbitrability of the dispute,
jurisdiction of the arbitrators, their appointment, challenge to their authority
,
their
removal and replacement. It also governs the form, validity and finality of the award
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including the right of recourse against it. Though less clearly, the law of the arbitral situs
also governs matters pertaining to the interpretation and enforcement of the arbitration
agreement and the conflict of rules applicable to the dispute.
The parties to an arbitration agreement must possess the capacity to enter into
such an agreement. In case they lack this capacity the resulting award may be denied
recognition and enforcement. The rules of law by which the capacity of the parties, to
enter into an arbitration agreement, is determined are by no means uniform and vary from
one jurisdiction to another. Further, it is important to note that though the New York
Convention states that the capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement is to be
determined under the law applicable to the parties it does not provide any mechanism for
determining this law. The issue is therefore to be resolved by the conflict of law rules of
the place of enforcement. In case the parties do not possess the requisite capacity under
the law of the arbitral situs, the arbitration agreement would not be valid under that law
and therefore denied enforcement.
Further, in order to decide a challenge to its jurisdiction, which it derives from the
arbitration agreement, an arbitral tribunal has to determine the law applicable to the
arbitration agreement which in turn requires the determination of the conflict of laws
rules applicable. Under the provisions of Article V(l)(a) of the New York Convention an
arbitration award may be denied recognition and enforcement if the arbitration agreement
is invalid, in the absence of an agreement of the parties to the contrary, under the law of
the country where the award was made.
The principle of party autonomy, which is generally accepted by various national
systems of law, international conventions and arbitral institutions, gives the parties the
91
freedom to choose for themselves the law that would govern the substantial issues in
dispute. Failure of the parties to come to an agreement over the law applicable to the
substantial issues gives rise to the difficult task of determining this law which involves
the determination involves the application of the contlict of laws rules. Though most
national systems of law permit substantial discretion for determining the appropriate
conflict of laws mles some nations require the arbitrators to apply the local conflict of
laws rules. If in such a situation the local law is not complied with the resulting award
would be set aside by the national courts of the forum acting under it's national law
thereby providing a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement of the award.
The arbitral situs agreed upon in the arbitration agreement may at the time of
dispute become an inconvenient forum in terms of the location of witnesses, materials,
books and other evidence. Practice of the Enslish courts has shown that the changes in
the law of the situs drastically affecting the procedural and substantive rights of the
parties also contributes towards a forum becoming inconvenient. This results in an issue
as to whether an arbitral situs may be transferred from one jurisdiction to another on the
finding that the contractually agreed forum was no longer a convenient forum. This in
turn raises the question of circumstances necessary for the holding of forum non-
conveniens. It is now a settled law that in for the finding of forum non-conveniens it must
be proved that the agreement was affected by fraud, undue influence or overweening
bargaining power. In absence of these considerations the party resisting the contractual
choice of forum must prove that the enforcement of the contractual choice would be
unreasonable and unjust or that the "proceedings in the contractual forum will be so
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gravely difficult and inconvenient that [the resisting party will or all practical purposes be
deprived of his day in the court."
The foregoing discussion clearly evinces the importance of the arbitral situs in a
arbitral process and highlights the importance of exercising this option with serious
caution and planning. A choice made in haste and without due consideration may result
in unanticipated practical and legal complications which may frustrate arbitration as an
effective means of dispute resolution.
m
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